Critique Of The International Crisis Groups's Report

Critique Of The International Crisis Groups's Report
By Dr. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe
NOTES #1: THE I.C.G's HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PAPER

N.B. The Executive Summary (pp.1-3) contains all the points and arguments raised in the paper. As such, comments and critical notes of the Executive summary provided herewith, can be regarded as a critique of the whole paper, or as addressing the salient points of the paper as a whole.

ON THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY [referred in the report as "overview"]

[1] First of all, it is not clear in the paper what it means by "international assistance". In the Burma context, is it in reference only to humanitarian assistance or to development assistance as well?

The two are different international aid categories. The paper contributes to the confusion by making no distinction between them, and by going from one to the other in an arbitrary, confusing, and ambiguous manner.

Development assistance in the Burma context is problematic, very much so. Humanitarian assistance on the other hand will however not be as problematic.

The lack of clarity, gives a strong impression that the paper (and the author or authors) is arguing for development assistance, while using the humanitarian assistance point of reference and context. This is what is most troubling about the paper as a whole.

[2.A] **p.1, col.1 and 2, in the Executive Summary** The paper says that international development agencies (IDAs) are making significant difference to the most vulnerable groups (…etc) in Burma.

The above is a sweeping statement, and which may apply perhaps to the Kachin State, to a certain extent. The people in this state and in Burma Proper are, comparatively speaking, not the most vulnerable. The most vulnerable are population living (or hiding) in areas decreed by the military government (military GOM) as BLACK and GREY areas. There is very little presence of the IDAs there because they are – according to the military GOM -- "sensitive" areas, or lacking in security.

The Black and Grey areas are literally free fire zones, and the population are not only IDPs, but treated by military patrols as outlaws, and are therefore at great risk of being killed, raped, etc., at will. They are reduced to living in hiding, and are hunted by the regime's troops, and whatever meager crops they plant for bare survival are destroyed by search-and-destroy patrols or columns. They live lives that are not better than hunted animals.

[2.B] **Site, as above** The paper says that the assistance provided by the IDAs do not have "any significant political cost" vis-B-vis strengthening the regime or undermining the movement for change.

The above raises this question: What is meant by "political costs"? This is a puzzling statement, even meaningless at a deeper level, and lacks proper or defined context.

One could interpret the statement as saying that the IDAs do not make any difference either way, and more importantly, that they (the IDAs) and the assistance they provide are politically neutral. How true or valid is this statement? Can assistance in a context where the government (or the state) is military-run, military-led, illegitimate, and repressive, and wedded to the status quo – opposed to political change -- be politically neutral, or not costly to the movement for change? Or is the paper saying that all things being equal, the people are the only ones gaining the most from the IDAs' presence and actions? This is not the case (See note 2.A, above).

[3.A] **p.1, col.2** Agree with the paper that there is a need for "fundamental changes" in the system. However, the paper does not talk about this need, although it does constructively, and often obliquely, refers to the flaws of the current system here and there

[3.B] The paper says that the military GOM rejects international advice and maintains "development policies and priorities, which are partly responsible for the current problems." However, this statement,

(a) understates the destruction to the country and the population wrought by the military GOM's arbitrary rule and repression (by representing it as "development policies and priorities"). It gives the impression that the military GOM was well-intentioned, but things went wrong, anyhow, and

(b) underestimates what it terms "problems". They are not problems. They are major crises, and are owed largely to the military GOM's protracted misrule, etc.

[3.C] The paper states that the military GOM rejects international advice and refuses to change its ways – i.e., to change its "development policies and priorities" (sic). If this is the case, one may usefully ask if there is any point in giving the regime international assistance, even though the bulk of the aid may be intended by donors for the people, not the government? This is a slippery down-slope road to travel.

[3.D] The paper recommends the inflow of international assistance and urge improved monitoring and distribution. To comment, "monitoring" is good sounding, but it is most problematic, all the more so if the IDAs do not have the political will and are moreover fearful of offending the military GOM, or are overly sensitive and responsive to its sensitivities.

[4.A] **p.1, col.2** The paper states that foreign governments and donors should both promote political change and social development. This is a curious statement in the Burma context especially.

What is meant by "social development" is not made clear in the paper, however.

Common sense however tells us that social development is geared to promoting or achieving something better, usually – and more so, nowadays -- political change in the democratic direction, or is meant to.

If such is the case, does the paper mean that the goal of international donors in providing development assistance is to promote political change? Or is the paper saying that the inflow of development assistance will result in or bring about social development and thus political change in Burma (albeit in the very long run)? [ NOTE: The thesis that social development (or, as is often argued, economic development) will bring about political change, although generally valid in the abstract, does not always hold true. This is a very slippery and dubious argument.]

The simple fact of the matter is that the military GOM does not want any change, much less political changes, and wants "development" as it defines it – i.e., maintain its hold on power and achieve greater control and repression capacity.

The question that therefore arises is: will the military GOM allow or welcome social development that is geared to political changes in the democratic direction? In this regard, the paper does acknowledge however that the military GOM does not want any kind of development that will erode the status quo it prefers.

[5] **p.2, col.1** The paper recommends that the main protagonists reassess their position and do their part to generate cooperation and synergy that has been lacking. This seems like a "sound good, feel good" statement.

The military GOM – the military regime – do not want to cooperate with anyone inside the country. It only wants to be obeyed and to maintain tight control. It is quite obvious that the military will not cooperate with anyone – including the IDAs and foreign governments – unless forced to by circumstance or is actively pressured.

A question that should be raised but is not, is what will international actors – governments and donor – do to persuade the military GOM to cooperate with the opposition if or when it (the opposition) wishes or agrees to work with the military GOM as a problem-resolving partner? Another question is, to what length will the international actors go in persuading the protagonists to cooperate?

[6] **Recommendation 1** Even though excellent, the recommendations alone, and the inflow of foreign assistance -- in the "business as usual" or conventional way -- will not persuade the military GOM to go this route. It is not interested in formalizing the current talks, sharing power, nor in including major stakeholders in the political process. What is needed is a firm, focused, and solid international front that does not believe in appeasing the military GOM in the faint or wistful hope that it will become and behave more like a government.

[7] **Recommendation 4** The points mentioned, i.e., the GOM's need to demonstrate a realistic understanding of the problems; minimize the obstructions currently placed on aid organizations; and increase the scope for international actors to work with local NGOs – these are good points. It is however unrealistic to expect much attention to these points from the GOM in particular, and the military in general, in the current situation, and without firm international persuasion.

[8] **Recommendation 6** Most useful. Perhaps NLD leaders inside have not been approached in this regard, requested a detailed policy paper on humanitarian aid.

It is however not clear in this paper on what is meant by "international assistance". See #1, above. [ NOTE: Development assistance was provided the previous GOM (of General Ne Win) in the 1970s. The end result was that it appealed to the international community to grant Burma the status of Least Developed Country in 1987, after claiming for decades that it was developing the country. ]

[9] **Recommendation 7** Ambiguous. What is meant precisely by "state capacity", and which or what kind of state? The context is missing.

In Burma, the state managed by the military – the GOM -- is not neutral, not the government of the people, i.e., it is the creature of the military, highly partisan, excludes broader society, and is not public service oriented. "State capacity" is patently defined by the GOM (and the military brass) as its capacity to maintain power and control, etc. It is most inappropriate therefore for any responsible scholar or well-intentioned group to recommend that the NLD and everyone to strengthen the capacity of the current state.

If by "state capacity" is meant serving the public or the people, there has first of all to be a fundamental political change.

[10] **Recommendation 10** International donors – and international NGOs as well – should certainly work with both the state and broader society forces, but it should be on an equal footing and formally/officially as well.

[11] **Recommendation 17** "Be prepared to lower the standard of transparency and accountability…" Why? This recommendation seems directed at encouraging international aid actors to defer tamely to the GOM, and to accept its arbitrary definition of "sensitive areas", "security", and "confidentiality".

[12] **Recommendations 14-18 (excepting the above)** These are excellent. But it seems that there is lacking political will on the part of outside actors to take on these recommendations in a serious and focused manner. The excellent recommendations, #14-18, are more or less, and in varying degrees, negated or subverted by recommendation #17 above.

Dr. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe tutored at Rangoon University's English Dept. from 1960-62, joined the Shan armed resistance in 1963. He was with the Shan State Army till 1977 and came to Canada in 1985. He went back to school at University of British Columbia to get a Master and a Phd and taught, mostly 3rd year classes, for more than 7 years at UBC and Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada.

ETHNIC POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE UNION OF BURMA

(The following paper is presented by Zo T. Hmung at a Seminar Organized by the Council for Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA) October 25, 2000

Approximately, Burma has a population of 48 million people. Of those 48 million, 68% are Burman, and the rest, 32 %, belong to the ethnic groups such as Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan, etc. This statistics are only the estimated statistics as there is no proper documented information available inside Burma. The ethnic people have their own religions, culture, and languages.

There are different religions such as Buddhism, Muslim, Christianity, and Hinduism. Burmans belong to the majority religion, Buddhism where most of ethnic Chins and Kachins are Christians. The ethnic political issue is important to Burma's politics. Because in order to put an end to civil war, which has spanned over half a century in Burma, the ethnic political crisis must first be resolved in accordance with the full consent of the ethnic minority people. Therefore, Burma's political history, especially how the minority and the majority groups came to live together under the Union government, needs to be addressed. The Formation of the Union Government: To be more precise, I will take an example from Chin history, as I am an ethnic Chin.

In 1886, the British annexed Burma and ruled together with India, from India, known as the British-Burma. At that time, Chin territory was an independent territory with its own political administration, culture, religion, and language, without any outside political interference. Ten years later, in 1896, the British occupied Chin territory and ruled together with Burma and India from India. Before the British's occupation, Chinland had lived independently since time immemorial. In 1937, for administrative convenience, the British divided her administration into two parts known as British-Burma and British-India. Chinland was ruled from British-Burma. On December 20, 1946, Mr. Clement Richard Atlee, then Prime Minister of United Kingdom of Great Britain, proposed granting independence to Burma at the House of Commons.

As a result, Aung San, who led the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), was invited to London to speak on ways to transfer to independence. Unfortunately, the Labor Party government in London had not invited any representatives from the ethnic groups, even though the ethnic people had voiced concern that Aung San could not represent their will concerning their future status with the British government. The British ignored the complaints of the ethnic groups and asked Aung San to gain consent of the Frontier Areas (Frontier areas means ethnic peoples). This unfortunate lack of representation became part of the impetus for the ethnic political crisis that is so evident today. If ethnic groups were given self-determination to choose their own destiny by the Labor Party government in London, today's political histories would be very different from today's ethnic political crisis in the Union of Burma.

The AFPFL had the right to represent the Burmans only, not the ethnic minority groups. AFPFL representative Aung San, for the interim government of Burma, and Clement Richard Atlee, for the British government, signed an agreement on January 27, 1947, for Burma to become an independent country within a year. The second step of political strategy for Aung San was to convince the ethnic groups to join the interim Burmese government during the transitional period, and to later form the Union government based on equal footing of all Union members. In order to convince the ethnic minority to join the interim government of Burma, the AFPFL’s campaign message was to gain independence from the British first, and then to form a Union government together. This campaign message of independence became powerful and convincing as the British had been ruling them for more than half a century. Everyone wanted to gain independence from the British colonial rule. Within a month of Aung San's return from England to Burma, representatives of Burma led by Aung San, along with representatives of the Chin, Kachin and Shan, signed an agreement popularly known as the Panglong Agreement at the Panglong Conference in Shan State on February 12, 1947. February 12 became Union Day in the Union of Burma and is observed as an official holiday in Burma. This clearly indicates how these different groups came together to form the Union country.

The Preamble of the Panglong Agreement said: "The members of the Conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins, and the Chins by their immediate cooperation with the Interim Burmese government" (See the Panglong Agreement). The basic concept of each state administration in federal system of government was evident in the Panglong Agreement. Article 5 of the Agreement said, "full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted" (See Panglong Agreement). A common interest, aimed for mutual benefits, had gathered together the Burmans and the ethnic people to form a Union government. Based on the Panglong conference, the Right of Secession was enshrined in the 1947 Union Constitution, Chapter X. This Right of Secession meant if one of the Union government members did not find benefits, or if they lost benefits within the Union government, that member had the right to depart from the Union government. In my opinion, as the proposed Union belonged to different groups with different territories/countries, the name of the government should not be Burma. It should have a different name, one that could represent all Union members.

Therefore, the Union government, according to the Panglong Agreement, was of the Union government of the Panglong signatories, which was based on trust, faith, and mutual benefits. Kio Mang, a Chin representative from Haka town, Chin State, said he singed the Panglong Agreement because he trusted in Aung San. The spirit of the Union and a trust of each other mattered to the Union-founding members. A Lack of Federalism in the 1947 Union Constitution After the Panglong Agreement, the AFPFL election followed in April. In this very first election, there were 255 seats; 210 seats were for Burmans and only 45 seats went to ethnic groups. Like today's National League for Democracy (NLD), the people mandated AFPFL, led by Aung San, as it was the party that took lead in the independence struggle for the Burmans. The above seats indicated that the Burmans could control the government and drive the Union government in their own way. Chances for the ethnic groups at the central government level were almost nil. However, it was the transitional period and the priority was about independence from British within a year. My assumption is that the ethnic groups did not focus on the importance of the election. In June 1947, Aung San led the drafting of the Union constitution for the future Union government, in accordance with the Panglong Agreement, to be a federal system of governance. Unfortunately, Aung San and his cabinets were assassinated on July 19, 1947, only one month after drafting had begun. U Nu headed the AFPFL continuance of the Union constitution drafting by appointing Tin Tut, Sir Ba U, E Maung, and Kyaw Myint. All were Burmans educated in the law school of Cambridge. U Chan Htoon was appointed as a constitutional adviser. No ethnic group participated in this constitutional drafting process. This process began the question of federalism in the Union of Burma. U Chan Htoon himself admitted that the Union Constitution did not represent the spirit of Union, which was federalism. He said: "Our constitution in theory federal, is in practice unitary". (Tinker, Hugh; "The Union of Burma" :London, 1967, p. 30). On September 24, 1947, the Union Constitution was adopted, becoming effective on January 4, 1948, the date that Burma gained independence. The Union Constitution was not even federal in theory; it was both unitary in theory and practice.

In a unitary system of government, the government is centralized wherein the federal state's powers are placed under the central government's direct control. I would like to take an example from Chin Special Division to show the relationship between the federal state and the central union government. For Chin Special Division, the President of the Union government appointed a Minister for Chin Affairs from a member of the Union government, upon nomination by the Union Prime Minister. The Union Minister member designated as a Minister for Chin Affairs was the head of the government. The power of the Minister's administration for Chin Affairs was subject to the approval by the Union government in all state affairs such as education, culture, etc. Therefore, the Minister was under the direct control of the central Union government. There is the Chin Affairs Council comprising of all members of Parliament elected by the Chin people. The Chin Affairs Council's function was simply to aid and advise the Minister for Chin Affairs in matters such as recruitment, postings, and transferring civil services. Therefore, they too were under direct control of the central Union government. Moreover, there was no provision for passing bills or the right to legislation of the Chin Special Division in the 1947 Union Constitution. This is called a system of centralized government putting every powers in the center. As such, the Chin people and Chin territory were in the hands of the Burmese. (See: 1947 Union Constitution, Part V: Section: 196, 197, 198). Another example is of the Kachin State. Like Chin Special Division, the Kachin had a State Council and a State government. The Minister for Kachin Affairs was the head of the government. Members of the State Council had partial right to pass bills of the state. The problem was, the bills should be presented to the President for approval, and should be subject to the President’s signature, in order to come into existence. And the State can only recommend the passing of the law to the Union parliament. (see Part II- 166-170 of 1947 Union Constitution).

Therefore, both in Chin Special Division and Kachin State, all powers, both in State and central government, went to central government. In federal system of government, the State Council or the federal state should be given full authority to function independently, especially in the case of Burma as it consists of different groups. The federal state should have had the right to legislation, especially in school, police, press, and other individual state affairs. In addition, the constitution should provide for the right of passing bills. Neither the Union government nor the central authorities should control or impose her authorities to federal state council or the state government. Even in the local government, there should be self-government, as there are many different dialects and cultures. The federal government's role should be in the matters of monetary issues, taxation, foreign affairs, communication, and federal armed forces. All these were absent in the Union Constitution of 1947. Therefore, the AFPFL, led by U Nu’s constitution of 1947, aimed to control all power in local, state, and central government. The Burman majority enjoyed all authority from top to bottom and bottom to top. In summary, the 1947 Union Constitution betrayed Aung San's Union as well as the Panglong Agreement. This constitutional crisis led to ethnic groups meeting in Taungyi on February 25, 1961 and submitting a proposal of federalism to parliament. Unfortunately, General Ne Win took power from U Nu, the Prime Minister of the Union government, claiming non-integration of the country on March 2, 1962. The ethnic issues continued to worsen. General New Win's Policy of Burmanization and Ethnic Cleansing Right after his military coup, General Ne Win began using a policy of Burmanization, also known as assimilation, that means making all ethnic groups into Burmans. He abolished the 1947 Constitution and ruled by guns. It was now forbidden to teach or learn ethnic languages in the universities and colleges. Burman cultural dress, such as Taihpung and Longkyi, became the official dress in offices and schools. In Chin State, there is not a single college or university. As result, many Chin people could not pursue higher education and became uneducated. Chins who attended the Mandalay University and Rangoon University were indoctrinated in Burman cultures. This is a calculated assimilation policy of Ne Win to assimilate all ethnic groups into Burmans. As a last resort, more ethnic minority groups took up arms against Ne Win’s dictatorial rule leaving families, relatives and friends behind in an attempt to regain their inherent rights and to safeguard their freedom. Ethnic civilians do not escape the Burmese Army's eye either because the Burmese Army regards them as supporters of the ethnic armed forces. They are subject to torture, imprisonment, and arbitrary arrest along with forced relocation.

In order to escape the Burmese Army's persecution, ethnic groups have fled to other countries for safe haven. The Revolutionary Council, from 1962 to 1974, and the Burma Socialist Program Party, the one party system, did not satisfy the majority of Burmans either. The Military regime not only failed the economic policy of the country, but also spent approximately 40% of the national income for the defense budget in order to strengthen the armed forces to fight against the ethnic armed forces. It had been used for ethnic cleansing activities. Selling her rich natural resources, such as hardwood to neighboring countries including Thailand could not solve the economic crisis. To bail out of the economic crisis, the only choice left was applying for the Least Developed Country status. In 1987, Burma became one of the ten poorest countries in the world. One of the main reasons for the 1988 uprising was freedom from the Burmese dictatorial rule, which included economic freedom, cultural freedom, educational freedom, etc. After the uprising, the regime doubled armed forces along with the doubling of opium production. Production of opium became one of the main sources of income for the Burmese Army. Most of opium production had been taken places in ethnic areas such as in the Wa area of Shan State. This has not only been a threat to Burmans and the ethnic groups, but also to the international community. The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999, released by the Department of State in March 2000, describes Burma as follows: "Burma has been, and continues to be, one of the world's largest producers of illicit opium. Burmese opium production doubled in 1989". (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999 released by the Department of State in March 2000, P. 5). The Burmese military regime regards the ethnic minority groups as the enemy. Two months ago, on August 7, 2000, the Central Executive Committee of the National League for Democracy (NLD) released a four points statement condemning the burning of Chin Christian’s churches, houses, school buildings and live stock. The fourth point of the statement said: "In Burma today, under the rule of the military dictators, if you are not a Burman Buddhist you are discriminated against. The military dictators regard you as an enemy." (Central Executive Committee, National League for Democracy, Statement 124 (8/00), 7 August 2000, Rangoon). This statement truthfully highlights the crux of the political crisis in Burma. For non-Burman groups, and those who oppose the SPDC, life in Burma is full of fear.

Two weeks ago, I was in Guam interviewing an estimated 280 refugees from Burma, mostly from Chin State on human rights issues. One thing that strikes me most concerns Chin girls. I was told that the Burmese Army is targeting Chin girls for marriage. These girls, and their families, obtain more opportunity by marrying members of the Burmese Army, and in the same way Burmese soldiers who marry Chin girls are promoted in rank. Chin women who married Burmese soldiers later received military training at the Football ground in Haka. They are then used to combat the activities of the Chin National Front. These Chin girls are used for both purposes of assimilation and attacking the Chin people. A high school teacher at Haka town, Chin State told me another painful story. One day the Army Captain came to his high school classroom saying that he needed the most beautiful girl in the classroom. Shortly thereafter, a Chin girl was taken to his house where it was later discovered she had been raped. Her family said they were afraid to report the rape to higher authorities knowing there would be no action taken and the family would surely be accused of lying. These acts committed crimes against humanity. Chin State, my State, is a restricted area. Chin-Americans could not travel to Chin State to visit their relatives. Foreigners are also not allowed to visit Chin State. In Chin State, approximately 10% are Burman, they are the Burmese Army and their families. Not less than 90% of the population is Chin people. Ten percent of the population holds power over the will of 90% of the population. The U.N Human Rights Commission’s Rapporteur Rajsoomer Lallah's report on Burma, released on October 16, 2000, said that the worst violence committed by the Burmese Army was against ethnic minorities.

This is about ethnic cleansing. According to the report of the U.S Committee for Refugees 2000 World Refugee Survey, at least 200,000 refugees from Burma live in Thailand, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, and other countries. Approximately, up to one million people are internally displaced. (US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 2000 Page 133). These figures provide a clear picture of the political crisis in Burma, a crisis which is about ethnic discrimination because not less than 90% of those who took refuge outside the country, and those internally displaced, are the ethnic people, not Burmans. The International Community's Role: The United Nations General Assembly has made resolutions on Burma for nine consecutive years. Recently, on October 10, 2000, the U.S Congress passed Resolution H. Con 328 including implementation of the results of 1990 general election. I think the U.N, the U.S, and other governments have a legitimate and powerful role to play in implementing the results of 1990 based on the will of the Burmese people. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) article 21: 3 says, "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government." The people of Burma have expressed their will, voting against the military regime and voting for democracy. The international community has the right to demand that the Burmese military regime transfer power to the 1990 election winners. In addition to the results of the 1990 election, it would also be helpful to concentrate more on the refugee situation and problems of the internally displaced persons inside the country, including ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes committed by the Burmese Army. From a humanitarian ground, the international community has a major role to play in today’s ethnic political problems in Burma. I strongly believe issues such as refugees in border areas, and internally displaced persons, would provide a sense of urgency to the international community, hence speeding up political change in Burma. Issue such as ethnic cleansing could become a spotlight in the efforts to implement the 1990 election and its legitimacy. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Chief Sadako Ogata's recent visit to a Karen refugee camp in the Thai-Burma border area on October 17, 2000 was very encouraging to refugees themselves, the ethnic groups, and the democratic forces, including the international community.

Ms. Ogata shared her insights upon her return from the refugee camp, saying to reporters, "I am sorry to say I was quite shocked." (Sadako Ogata, UNHCR Chief, BurmaNet News, October 17, 2000). Indeed, the SPDC does care about the international community's voice and pressure. They respond to the truth of events by disseminating wrong and untruthful news to the international community. For instance, on October 17, 2000, U Win Aung, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Myanmar to the Millennium Summit in New York, spoke at the Summit saying, "We do no harm to anyone. We do not commit any atrocities". (MYANMAR INFORMATION COMMITTEE, YANGON Information Sheet N0. B-1525(I) 9 September, 2000).

Therefore, the involvement and role of the international community is crucial to motivating political change in the Union of Burma. Lessons from the Past: People should look to the future. However, many lessons are to be learned from the past. One key area is from a Panglong perspective. From a Panglong perspective, the Union existed because of the Panglong signatories. The spirit of Panglong should be restored, respected, and honored because the Union is not of the Burmans alone; rather it is of all ethnic groups. The Union Constitution should also be a federalism giving full functioning power to each state government. Equally important, the Right of Secession should be enshrined in the new Union Constitution. These were dreams of the Union’s founding members. When we look back at the 1990 elections, the NLD won 396 seats out of 485 seats. The SPDC won only 10 seats and the other 79 seats went to independent and ethnic groups.

In accordance with this election rule, Pyithu Hluttaw (People's Assembly) was to form the Union government, which was based upon the size of population. As Burmans are majority in number, it seems that the Union government will always go to the hands of the Burman majority and the ethnic groups will have a hard time defending or proposing their agendas at Union Parliament. Therefore, "drafting the new Union Constitution of Burma will indeed be a crucial question for the future Union of Burma." (Hmung, Zo T; My Vision for Chinland: Chin National Journal, 1997, P. 109).

Conclusion: After the 1988 democratic uprising, both ethnic groups and Burman democratic forces have joined together in the efforts to restore genuine democracy in the Union of Burma. There is hope for the future. This hope should be based on equal footings and equal status of all the Union members. The independence hero, Aung San once said to the ethnic people; "If Burma receives one kyat, you will also get one kyat"(Smith, Martin: "Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity", London, 1991, P. 78). A Kyat is a Burmese currency. In other words, if a Chin gets one dollar, a Burmese also will get an equal amount, which is a dollar. It is about the right to equality. Aung San’s dream for the Union government was based on equality and self-determination. Unfortunately, the AFPFL governments and the Burmese military regime ignored Aung San's dream. I believe Burma’s pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, being the daughter of Aung San, surely knows her father's dream.