Myanmar’s Minority Conundrum: Issues of Ethnicity and Authority
David I. Steinberg (Georgetown University )
Background
The issue of the status and authority of the one-third of the population of Myanmar (Burma), composed of diverse indigenous non-Burman peoples, remains the most intractable of the problems facing the Burmese state since independence in 1948.1 The sharing of political power in some manner acceptable to the local populations, and social and economic equity among these diverse peoples are all related to, but even more fundamental and difficult of solution than, the issue of the political form of government that has bedeviled the state for decades. Burma-Myanmar has been on the brink of fragmentation because of the diffuse, often antithetical, perceptions of these issues by one or more ethnic groups since independence. The desires for independence from the British, dependant on minim! al titular ethnic unity, and the forceful leadership of General Aung San whose role was accepted by most minorities, were the factors that initially succeeded in bringing these groups together at the Panglong Conference in February 1947 that forged the fragile cohesion that existed on independence. An effective answer to the minority issues is still sought, and its amelioration or solution may provide signals and models for approaching some of the more delicate other national issues that transcend ethnicity.
The unity of the state has been a primary goal of the military SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) and the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). The concern over this goal is, however, not a product of this relatively new incarnation of the military. Since independence, the Burmese military have fought for the unity of the state; more specifically the 1958 and then 1962 military coups were carried out with the avowed purposes of preventing civil war and upholding this unity.
The problem of internal unity has had external dimensions. As the Burmese military has been preoccupied with national unity, senior staffs have been suspicious of the role that foreign nations and peoples have played in fomenting national fragmentation and disunity. They accurately can point, and do so continuously in the controlled press, to history to support their present concerns. They correctly charge that the British employed the ‘divide and rule’ policy of administratively separating some of the peripheral minority areas from Burma Proper (where most of the Burmans lived).2 More important, however, has been recent history, when each foreign power, unofficially and often clandestinely, at one time or another has supported for their own and diverse purposes, political or ethnic rebellions involv! ing minority peoples. These included some unofficial British encouragement of independence for the Karen, Chinese assistance to the Burma Communist Party,3 United States covert support to Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) troops that retreated into Burma in 1949-50,4 external Muslim support to Muslim rebels in the Arakan, Indian connivance with Naga and Chin rebels on that frontier, and Thai assistance at various national and local levels to a wide variety of ethnic and political rebellions located along its long littoral. It is no wonder that Burmese authorities have viewed with great suspicion the roles that foreigners have in the past played in interfering in their country, have projected these same roles into the present, and fear that they may exist into the future. Present internal administrative policies are in part likely to have been formulated with this in mind.
These past problems, severe in themselves and sufficient to cause suspicions, were however aggravated by seven additional and important factors:
[1] Some of these peoples had significant Christian percentages of their populations in contrast to the overwhelming importance of Buddhism among the Burmans.5 This aroused the sympathies of some of the external Christian communities and sects that helped propagandize the plight of these peoples and gave them moral (and perhaps financial) support.
[2] As the military, especially in the period of military rule under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP: 1962-1988), insulated the state from the outside world, the minority groups were more in touch with external affairs and foreign elements for both weapons and moral support than was the central Burmese government. Thus they made their case to the court of world opinion while the military regime became more introverted, isolated, and more xenophobic. This naturally increased suspicions that foreigners were once again aimed at dividing the country.
[3] The Burman majority is the only major ethnic group that does not have ethnic kin in other lands across the arbitrarily demarked colonial borders; this creates a sense of international ethnic identity Burmans lack.6 In traditional Southeast Asia, boundaries in the modern sense did not exist. Power radiated out in concentric circles from the center and states could be associated with more than one suzerain group, and pay tribute to them. The colonial powers extended administrative control to borders that lacked ethnic, geographic, or other considerations, thus creating some of the problems states in the region today face.
[4] The military, perhaps without central authority and on the whims of individual local but exceedingly powerful military commanders, have treated the minorities, among whom they were stationed and whom they administered, with disdain for their cultures and often religions.7 Charges of human rights abuses and forced porterage by the military in border regions are widespread.
[5] The hill (minority) areas were climatically suitable for the production of poppies from which opium, morphine, and heroin were produced, thus giving those engaged in this trade the means to purchase arms and the motivation to keep the central government at arm’s length. Opium production was introduced in the colonial period, and until 1959 opium was legal in the Shan State and sawbwas (local maharajas) received revenues from its use.
[6] The natural resources of the hill regions, such as jade and timber, provided lucrative means to sustain local populations in rebellion.
[7] Foreign missionaries and then international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), some of which had religious origins, were extensively involved with the minorities both because they often were animists and more susceptible to Christian conversion, and then because poverty was exceptionally high and health standards low in those regions.
All of these factors have increased mutual suspicions.
However accurate the perceptions of foreign support to various diverse minorities may have been in the past, the situation has vastly changed since the earlier period of Burmese independence. It is now accurate to maintain that no foreign power wants to see the break up of the Burmese state. The balkanization of Myanmar would create conditions of potential chaos in that country, a pivotal state that has become the nexus of real, but unstated, regional rivalry between India and China. Without question the instabilities created would spill over into the region and exacerbate these obvious, if unadmitted, rivalries. There would likely be increases in refugees and illegal immigration, expanded epidemics and health problems, and an even greater trade in narcotics and trafficking in women.8 In a sense, the! past perceptions of the Burmese leadership have been erroneously perpetuated into the present, creating suspicions that no longer are grounded. These perceptions, however inaccurate they may be, markedly contribute to the difficulty of resolving these issues.
As foreign perceptions have also changed, most minority aspirations have also undergone major shifts. Where some minority leaders in the past had publicly advocated independence, some UN trusteeship, most now do not do so. They have instead argued for some form of local autonomy or federal authority, although the word ‘federal’ seems anathema to the military who equate it with virtual independence and the eventual effective break up of the state.9 Independence of any of the regional groupings within Myanmar would not be economically sustainable, and could lead to the kind of ‘ethnic cleansing’ we have witnessed too frequently in other areas.
Yet the old acquiescence of the minorities to Burman domination is now more problematic. As Burman nationalism has understandably grown, so has ethnic nationalism, a phenomenon that is evident worldwide. This means that minorities are likely to demand more from the center as they see their brethren having more autonomy and doing better across the porous borders.
This paper will consider only the issue of the indigenous minorities of Myanmar. The status of the non-indigenous minorities, more specifically the Indian (all those from the subcontinent) and Chinese communities, are not discussed here although their previous and present positions in the economy have strongly and negatively affected Burman attitudes toward foreign economic exploitation and suspicions of the role of foreigners in that society. The colonial period Burmese economy was essentially under foreign control, which was a highly significant factor in the political legitimacy of socialism–getting the economy once again under Burman control. The Indian community occupied a most important position in the colonial and pre-independence period, but since have been replaced in the last decade by the ! Chinese as the single dominant foreign economic influence in the society. Suspicions and prejudices against these groups so intensified that in 1984 a nationality act was passed that relegated inferior status to all those minorities that could not establish residence in Burma before 1824 (the beginnings of colonial influence through the First Anglo-Burmese War and the importation of Indian labor and Chinese immigration). Although the importance of these communities should not be underestimated, they represent a different issue except where Chinese influence has deeply penetrated the ethnic minority groups along the Chinese frontier. Yet the overwhelming and obvious Chinese presence and wealth are potentially explosive and should not be ignored either by the leaders of Myanmar or foreign observers.
State Goals
The goal of national unity of the SLORC/SPDC government is thus conceptually appropriate, proper, and potentially in the interests of the peoples of that country and in those of the neighboring nations. In Myanmar, the role of the military is not now to protect the state from external enemies10 (the function of the military in most states), for such enemies are presently nonexistent, but rather to enforce internal security and preserve internal unity. Although military functions may be different from those in many other countries, the problem the state faces is not in its goal, but rather in the means employed by the central military authorities and their regional commanders to reach that goal. One essential conclusion of this paper is that the military government through its policies and actions is ! undercutting, even destroying, the possibility of attaining its own goal of long-term national unity toward which it struggles. Yet over a longer period the reputation and efficacy of the military will be determined by its ability to attain national unity. This disconnect between goal and its realization is a critical issue facing the military authorities that is obscured by their (presumed) view that the situation is essentially under control for the shorter term through the cease-fires, the amelioration of many active rebellions, and a greater government presence in the periphery. This is likely to be illusory.
That admittedly strong statement needs explication, for on the surface the SLORC/SPDC can point with considerable pride to the changes it has brought about in the minority regions. There is now a wide array of cease fires with diverse minority peoples; the bloodshed has stopped, but it had continued for decades, in some areas even over two generations, and this is not easily forgotten. This has brought some relief to some of the minority peoples, and has further served to strengthen the military in its control over the state as a whole, for it has freed its troops to deal with the remaining insurgencies that have become weaker and more ineffective. Some infrastructure has been built where little existed before, providing access to previously isolated regions, and there now is a concerted effort to ad! minister regions that were essentially beyond the control of the central government almost since independence. The creation of a new ministry, the Ministry of Development of Border Areas and National Races under an August 1993 law, is part of the process. As access has been strengthened or created, so has the responsibility of the central authorities in direct or indirect management increased.
Yet these new conditions of relative tranquility remain fragile. The cease fires have not solved problems–they have sequestered them for an indefinite period, but such armistices are likely to collapse without major changes and improvements in the economic and social conditions of these peoples, and in the political arrangements that must be made to provide some locally defined degree of justice in the majority-minority relationships.
If the minorities in some cases have relied on foreign moral support, the Burmese government has in part not been candid in its portrayal of minority issues. Under the BSPP military government, the state downplayed minority issues in such international United Nations fora as ECAFE (later ESCAP), claiming that there were no such issues. Later, under the SLORC/SPDC it has averred that there were 135 ‘races,’ all of whom had to be dealt with in some appropriate manner and for whom the old administrative structures did not work.11 Both approaches grossly exaggerated the issue but from opposite points of the spectrum. The figure of 135 ‘races’ is actually a pre-World War II designation of a linguistic map that includes languages and dialects of such languages.12 There are actually far fewer ethnic groups,! and ‘race’ is not an appropriate scientific term to apply to this diversity. Many believe that the military in differing periods has used the minority issue–either dismissing it or overemphasizing it–as a means to perpetuate its direct control.
The formation and expansion of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) create another element of social and political control by the Burman military-dominated group over minority peoples. With between about 15 million members, it is a military attempt at mass mobilization that increases the tatmadaw’s capacity for action toward its desired ends. Although it is Burman lead and completely controlled by the military, its membership has been extended to minority regions.
Majority-Minority Problems
There is a profound lack of trust between the majority and individual minority groups that has become exacerbated over time. In their efforts to maintain national unity, the tatmadaw has engaged in actions that have lengthened the distance between majority and the minorities, and thus made more tenuous the relationships between Burman and most minorities. These actions may have been in response to varied stimuli such as perceived internal threats to the state sometimes encouraged from foreign sources, attempts to ensure internal military hegemony over all centers of power within the state, and an essential disdain of minority cultures and peoples. These actions include:
Elimination of the limited local minority autonomy under civilian rule (1948-58, 1960-62).
Direct administration of local government in minority areas by military personnel.
Treatment of minority areas as virtually foreign occupied territories.
Elimination of significant minority leadership in the upper echelons of the tatmadaw.
Lack of official recognition of education in local, non-Burman languages.
Restriction of the avenues of social mobility for minority peoples.
Lack of respect for local religious practices in certain minority areas (especially the Chin State).
Arbitrary confiscation of land.
Lack or transfer of central economic resources to minority areas commensurate with their believed contribution to the national income (through exploitation of natural resources).
Support of military units foraging off the countryside and the confiscation of land for military and military-owned agricultural purposes.
Forcing villagers to be removed to alternative, military approved sites and in some areas creating ‘free-fire’ zones.
Forced porterage of military supplies in the minority areas where fighting is endemic.
If mutual trust is not forthcoming, major points of tension could intensify these past problems. For example, the minority groups involved in the cease fires have not surrendered to the Burmese authorities. They still are allowed to retain their weapons and can engage in their traditional agricultural pursuits. But when, for example, a new constitution is promulgated, and before elections can be held, the minorities are supposed to surrender their weapons to ensure the fairness of such voting. It is highly unlikely that this will happen beyond some token release of arms. The levels of trust do not now exist, and are unlikely to exist in the future without significant changes in the administration of minority affairs, to encourage the withdrawal of such weaponry . The surrender of! arms by minorities around the world under various peace plans has not worked, and it is highly unlikely that it would occur in Myanmar, where ethnically related insurgencies have continued for so long and distrust is so high.
The military have promised to deliver to minority areas increased access to education, health services, and employment opportunities. Yet the budgets allocated to such activities are highly limited and inadequate to accomplish the intended purposes. These budgets seem mainly to be the reported reallocation of previously determined national sectoral budgets (education, health, etc.) to these areas, but the total national budgets for such services are already grossly insufficient for the needs on a national basis and have deteriorated in real and per capita terms over the past decade, let alone in the minority regions.
Thus mutual levels of suspicion, inflamed by historical precedents and recent activities, require the deft handling of negotiations at least to meet the minimal set of requirements of all sides. There is no evidence that there is either this political will or interest.
The situation becomes more complex when the role of the National League for Democracy (NLD) is factored into the already complicated equation. The NLD, although in alliance with a number of minority parties especially the Shan NLD, is essentially a Burman party. It has through the exiled National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) called for ‘National Reconciliation’ at a March 6-7, 2001meeting close to the Thai border. It supported making public the secret dialogue between the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi that started in October 2000 and that continues at this writing, and wants the minorities brought into the dialogue process but at a later date because the present dialogue conditions are too fragile. It sees a staged set of consultations: intra-ethnic (to ensure t! hose representing a minority are legitimate), inter-ethnic, and national. It recognizes that although minorities are considered as ethnic entities, they are internally split with factional problems that must be overcome. Yet the government and the NLD share a common attitude: each demands from its adherents a kind of orthodoxy that makes dialogue far more difficult.
Current Dilemmas
Many observers outside Myanmar have been encouraged by the private dialogue that has taken place from October 2000 between members of the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi, de facto leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD). The United Nations Special Representative, Ambassador Razali Ismail, has been active in pursuing this welcome initiative, and his involvement in Myanmar has so far been positive. He was in Myanmar in early June, and is expected to return to Yangon in July. Yet there are many who remain skeptical about the potential for success (even the use of such a term is certainly defined by the interests of each of the parties) for a number of reasons, most obviously because it is highly unlikely that the military will give up essential power, although cosmetic changes s! eem possible, even likely. Important as well has been the lack of inclusion of minorities in such a dialogue. This has been a concern of Ambassador Razali as well, but at this writing there seems to be no action on this issue; while the opposition feels it is premature, perhaps the government would rather attempt to isolate the NLD (and, of course, its leadership) from the minorities. This is of importance to the minorities because the NLD is essentially a Burman party, what is left of it after being decimated by the military authorities. Although it is true that in the 1990 election the NLD overwhelmingly won, they were in alliance with a series of minority political parties as well.
In the early period following the establishment of the SLORC, the NLD position (or more accurately that of Aung San Suu Kyi) seems to have been that the solution to minority issues could be easily resolved following the re-institution of democracy in that country, and thus discussion of specific minority questions should be delayed to some later date.14 That seems to have changed. As the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) has attempted to draft possible constitutions for the state, acts that the military have said to be illegal, the National Convention that the SLORC convened to draw up a new constitution with a highly select group of delegates and in a manner that was heavily scripted and controlled, has floundered on the issues of minority representatio! n and power under such a new configuration.
As the issue of a new constitution is sporadically debated, the state organs of information have leaked certain guidelines on minority rule that are likely to be enshrined under a new constitution, whenever it may appear, led by the military authorities. The first is that the former minority ‘states’ (Shan, Kachin, etc.) are inappropriate as pivotal administrative entities because they are inaccurate descriptions of ‘race,’ as these areas contain many minority groups, not only the ethnic group for which the state was named (the Chin State is an exception). Second, that in order for some of the most important cease fires to continue, some groups with concentrated ethnic populations within contiguous townships would have a degree of local autonomy called ‘self-administered zones.! ’ Most important among them are the Wa, who are the best armed and most difficult to contain. Others are said to be planned for the Naga, Danu, Kokang, Pa-O, and Palaung peoples.
This is an effective but short-term strategy. This provides such groups with local autonomy that they have never legally had since independence, and at the same time it defuses power to such a local level that it has no national impact. The model for such activity may be drawn from the Chinese ‘autonomous regions,’ where limited local authority rests with minority groups but real power is lacking. The Chinese model may appear to more savory than the Russian model, which the Burmese may view as having led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. If the British engaged in a ‘divide and rule’ policy, so it can be charged that the military is intent on a similar approach but using more modern methods. Yet the Burmese authorities will be able to explain to the outside world that in fac! t they have granted more autonomy to minorities than any previous civilian government, and this will be at least accurate in part, although misleading as a whole. This, the tatmadaw may claim, should satisfy foreign critics who harp on human rights.
The levels of distrust between the majority and minority ethnic groups are part of a series of such apprehensions about the sharing of power. They are part of the pattern of problems that include a tendency of the central government (civilian and military alike) to deny effective authority to any potential peripheral political, ethnic, or social grouping. Although these tendencies are simply that, and can be overcome, it makes compromise more difficult.
The minority issues are further complicated by internal divisions among some minorities and fighting between some of them. The Karen National Union, the oldest extant rebellion in the state, has for years been led by Bo Mya, an anachronistic leader who is evidently out of step with the younger Karen rebel leaders who would be prepared to make compromises with the SPDC. In the recent (spring 2001) disputes between the Thai and Myanmar authorities, there seems to have been an attempt to pit one minority against another. As the Wa, supported by the SPDC, have moved and continue to plan to move 50,000 families (perhaps 200,000 people) south toward the Thai frontier from their traditional home areas close to the Chinese border in the Shan State, this has become of great concern to t! he Thai. The rebel Shan State Army, so reports indicate, has been armed and encouraged by the Thai to fight the Wa, while the Burmese authorities support the Wa as a means to deal with the Shan State Army and indicate to the Thai that the Burmese dominate the area.
Suggestions for Potential Resolution of Minority Problem
The solution to the internal distribution of ethnic power in Myanmar must result from actions by the Burmese peoples themselves. Yet foreigners do have a role in reinforcing the potential for accommodation and progress. Basically, they must recognize and respect the real concerns of the military for maintenance of national unity. This is not simply state-generated propaganda, as is sometimes charged by foreign observers. Perhaps one way to demonstrate this concern is for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ASEAN together with China, the U.S., and other powers) to reaffirm the territorial integrity of the state of Myanmar. This simple act of recognizing the status quo is seemingly redundant, yet it could be a step toward reassuring the military of the validity of its paramount concern–natio! nal unity.
Private foreign organizations, the international NGOs (non-governmental organizations), have potentially important roles to play as well. The military do not have the budgets, the knowledge, and lack the trust of the local populations to solve the economic issues that these peoples face. Often deprived of their ancestral villages and agricultural land, moved into safe areas where their actions can be monitored by the military and prevented from being sympathizers of, or bases for, potential insurgents, these peoples desperately need basic human needs assistance. This at present must come, if it is to be provided at all, from the international NGO community. Such assistance is in the interests of all parties. Support by such groups helps build local coalitions and organizations th! at can band together to resolve local problems and this contribute to the social and economic stability of the region–a desirable development that would in fact strengthen the military’s primary goal of national unity. The long-term goal is the re-creation of civil society at the local level in Myanmar–a step that would foster local pluralism (not independence), and would train foreign specialists on that society. It should be noted that Aung San Suu Kyi was first opposed to any NGO humanitarian assistance in Myanmar, but has since modified her position to acquiesce to their presence if they do not assist the government or its related institutions and organizations. The ubiquitous presence of the state makes this difficult at best. The March 2001 National Conciliation meeting of the NCGUB mentioned above endorsed humanitarian assistance to these areas.
The second step would be for a compromise on local autonomy. The provision of local autonomy to specific minority groups, as presently envisaged by the government under its proposed ‘self-administered areas,’ could be maintained as a sign of progress. Such autonomy could be limited to customary and family law, inheritance, some forms of local taxation, etc. At the same time, some of the previous administrative functions of the seven states and divisions could be maintained, and their representation built into a national legislature but not necessarily exactly on the model of the 1947 constitution. These two administrative layers would not necessarily be inconsistent with each other. As the center devolves authority to the state and divisions, so the states could devolve certain t! ypes of authority to the townships. The groups receiving such local ‘self-administration’ would be pleased to have the greatest degree of autonomy they have experienced, although groups such as the Shan and Kayah would see their former limited autonomy during the civilian period erode further.
These approaches themselves would be inadequate without the military receding into the background in minority areas. This would involve the military retaining responsibility for the maintenance of the borders and the garrison of such troops necessary to ensure the preservation of the state and to deal with such issues as transnational crimes, including narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, etc. But it would necessarily involve the military in the training of minority peoples in aspects of local public administration starting long before such a new system were to come into effect–perhaps during a two-year period. An administrative cadre needs to be created to take over the administration of township and state-level offices and functions, now run by the military. Those remainin! g from the previous civilian era are too few, old, and outdated to staff the positions that would be required under such a system; such positions are now dominated by the military. A staged military withdrawal from local administration would be an important element of any amelioration of minority issues; continuation of direct military administration, even under a ‘civilianized’ administration, would exacerbate problems.
Budgetary issues have long been a problem, with minorities in the civilian period proclaiming that they did not receive an adequate share of national resources. A more effective system of sharing of such resources needs to be determined in consultation with various minority groups. These budgetary arrangements under present and likely near-term future conditions would require that the percentage of funding going to the military budget, both officially and publicly recognized and that buried in other accounts, be reduced, for without sufficient economic incentives any solution to the minority issues will not take place.
The devolution of some significant authority in local affairs should not alone be concentrated in minority regions. The Burman divisions also should be included, because the 1990 election indirectly indicated dissatisfaction with the lack of local participation in the administrative processes. There are few models from which Myanmar could adapt a local autonomy system in ASEAN. Most of the states are effectively under centralized control. The Philippines has proceeded rapidly to decentralize, and Indonesia has embarked on a massive program to do the same at the district level, bypassing the province. Although these moves may encourage greater democratization, they also can spread ecological and health problems, as central control evolves to less circumspect local officials. The p! ositive and negative lessons from those experiences could prove instructive.
Local state and/or township authority should extend to educational systems, in which local languages may be taught as long as the national language of Burmese is also included in the curriculum. This has not been possible under any Burmese administration, and the change would likely be greeted with enthusiasm by local peoples. Language is one of the critical indicators of identity, and preservation and use has become intimately associated with nationalism. Language policy has been a critical component of ethnic complaints on every continent, even inciting rebellion (witness Sri Lanka).
The granting of certain rights to the minorities is necessary but not sufficient. Ironically, as the state should loosen control over the peripheral minority areas, it must tighten control over the military command system. The regional military commanders, who have been elevated to inclusion on the SPDC, need to come under central authority to control their arbitrary actions that only serve to undercut centrally mandated change. Some regional commanders have become the equivalent of warlords with wide discretionary authority. Further, they have remained in their posts far longer than in previous administrations, thus strengthening their control. The state should redefine their nonmilitary functions, reducing their authority over civilian administration and control.
Finally, the military should actively recruit (as once they did) minorities into the senior military leadership. There seems little question that the military will retain effective and ultimate power within the state as they have done since independence and under any likely future government over the next decade or two, even though some positions will probably be provided to civilian leadership and retired military, and that opposition parties may be allowed to function more fairly. This will occur through military representation in a national legislature and through other means. Simply because it is most probable that the military, which has created a dual society—an ascendent military and a subservient civilian (of any ethnic background) one—that is pervasive, that the military! should share some of that power with minorities who can rise within the military ranks as evidence of the fairness of the government and as a means to alleviate ethnic discrimination.
These suggestions are unlikely to be instituted. Yet they could constitute the beginnings of a set of compromises that could have important implications for the defusion of the antagonisms that have caused the loss of so many lives over so many years, and pauperized what should have been a rich and vibrant region of the country. If the immediate problems of the minorities can be assuaged, then the lessons from that process could assist any central government through creating administrative and representational models. Final authority essentially would remain in Burman hands, but under a system regarded as much more fair. Because the military have the authority and power in the state, they must assume greater responsibility to start a process through which the tensions could be am! eliorated and eventually resolved.
The Role of Japan
Since the early 1950s, Japan has played the most important role in Burma-Myanmar of any foreign industrialized state. Historically, this relationship began to flower with the Japanese training of the anti-colonial ‘30 comrades’ in 1940, two of whom were Aung San and Ne Win. Even though the Japanese-induced independent state of Burma in World War II was spurious, and the Burmese turned against the Japanese in the spring of 1945, many Burmese active in that period still remain close to Japan. Beginning with reparations in the mid 1950s, Japan provided $2.2 billion in economic assistance in loans and grants until the 1988 coup.24 Since then, new lending has stopped, but assistance has continued to be provided for completing old projects, humanitarian assistance (sometimes stretching! its definition), and debt relief. Over $500 million has been provided in that period.
The Japanese aid program has undergone revision, and various human rights and good governance provisions have been applied to foreign support, although they have been only sporadically employed (e.g., Indonesia under Suharto). Among the industrialized states, however, Japan and the United States are at opposite ends of the assistance pole: the United States has been rigid in its prohibition on U.S. aid and later on new investment, while Japan has taken a lenient stance. Japanese firms had petitioned the Japanese Embassy in Rangoon for recognition of the regime in 1990, and since then have lobbied for both aid and investment. Japan has been caught between its close relationship with the United States, which opposes any but humanitarian assistance and then not to the government, an! d Keidanren and various ministries that want to restart lending. The emotional attachment of Japan to Burma-Myanmar is very strong.25
During the Ne Win era (which may not yet have reached its final moments), Japanese diplomats had more access to the Burmese leadership than those of any other country. Even as early as 1958, Ne Win was quoted during the ‘Caretaker’ military government as wishing to import Japanese farmers to teach productive farming to the Burmese in the Mu River valley. Today, the treatment of visiting Japanese by the government has been the most friendly of any OECD country. Japan continues to play a critical foreign role today. This, then, gives Japan a great opportunity to affect positively the process of reform in that country, but it also creates a greater responsibility to do so with foresight and deftness. Perhaps because Japan did not want to take a high profile role in Burma-Myanmar in ! the 1970s and 1980s, it never sufficiently pressed for economic reforms that were needed (neither did the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany assistance). Political changes before 1988, to this writer’s knowledge, were never seriously discussed by any donor.
In 1999, this writer accompanied a distinguished Japanese delegation to Yangon, and recommended at that time that Japan provide humanitarian assistance through Japanese and international NGOs and through the UNDP because it would support needed help to the poor, train future Japanese specialists on Burma-Myanmar, strengthen the Japanese NGOs, and help begin the process or rebuilding civil society in Myanmar. But he recommended against restarting lending until significant changes took place in the political economy. In a sense, Japanese policy seems to have been to encourage change through provision of support, while the U.S. has withheld support until change occurs. This writer believes that an intermediate position of humanitarian aid and staged assistance through confidence-bui! lding measures would be the most reasonable approach.
But any assistance, even negotiations, should take place in a quiet, measured atmosphere without public hectoring that plays to the internal politics of the potential donor and encourages emotional nationalistic responses and defense. A former Japanese ambassador to the U.S. at a lecture at Georgetown University, when asked what was the single most important thing the U.S. could do to improve Japanese-U.S. relations, replied that the U.S. should stop criticizing Japan in public. That advice remains sound for a broad spectrum of international relations.
APPENDIX: David I. Steinberg, ‘Myanmar: Military Rule and the Undermining of Civil Society,’ in Nat J. Colletta, Teck Ghee Lim, & Anita Kelles-Viitanes, eds. Social Cohesion and Conflict Prevention in Asia. Managing Diversity Through Development. Washington, D.C. The World Bank, 2001.
David I Steinberg is Director of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and a senior consultant to The Asia Foundation. He is the author of four books and numerous articles on Burma-Myanmar. His latest volume is Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2001). The views expressed herein are his alone.
Source: Online Burma Library www.burmalibrary.org (JAPAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, At The Front Lines Of Conflict Prevention In Asia Conference July 6-7, 2001 Tokyo)
Saturday, September 8, 2007
Critique Of The International Crisis Groups's Report
Critique Of The International Crisis Groups's Report
By Dr. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe
NOTES #1: THE I.C.G's HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PAPER
N.B. The Executive Summary (pp.1-3) contains all the points and arguments raised in the paper. As such, comments and critical notes of the Executive summary provided herewith, can be regarded as a critique of the whole paper, or as addressing the salient points of the paper as a whole.
ON THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY [referred in the report as "overview"]
[1] First of all, it is not clear in the paper what it means by "international assistance". In the Burma context, is it in reference only to humanitarian assistance or to development assistance as well?
The two are different international aid categories. The paper contributes to the confusion by making no distinction between them, and by going from one to the other in an arbitrary, confusing, and ambiguous manner.
Development assistance in the Burma context is problematic, very much so. Humanitarian assistance on the other hand will however not be as problematic.
The lack of clarity, gives a strong impression that the paper (and the author or authors) is arguing for development assistance, while using the humanitarian assistance point of reference and context. This is what is most troubling about the paper as a whole.
[2.A] **p.1, col.1 and 2, in the Executive Summary** The paper says that international development agencies (IDAs) are making significant difference to the most vulnerable groups (…etc) in Burma.
The above is a sweeping statement, and which may apply perhaps to the Kachin State, to a certain extent. The people in this state and in Burma Proper are, comparatively speaking, not the most vulnerable. The most vulnerable are population living (or hiding) in areas decreed by the military government (military GOM) as BLACK and GREY areas. There is very little presence of the IDAs there because they are – according to the military GOM -- "sensitive" areas, or lacking in security.
The Black and Grey areas are literally free fire zones, and the population are not only IDPs, but treated by military patrols as outlaws, and are therefore at great risk of being killed, raped, etc., at will. They are reduced to living in hiding, and are hunted by the regime's troops, and whatever meager crops they plant for bare survival are destroyed by search-and-destroy patrols or columns. They live lives that are not better than hunted animals.
[2.B] **Site, as above** The paper says that the assistance provided by the IDAs do not have "any significant political cost" vis-B-vis strengthening the regime or undermining the movement for change.
The above raises this question: What is meant by "political costs"? This is a puzzling statement, even meaningless at a deeper level, and lacks proper or defined context.
One could interpret the statement as saying that the IDAs do not make any difference either way, and more importantly, that they (the IDAs) and the assistance they provide are politically neutral. How true or valid is this statement? Can assistance in a context where the government (or the state) is military-run, military-led, illegitimate, and repressive, and wedded to the status quo – opposed to political change -- be politically neutral, or not costly to the movement for change? Or is the paper saying that all things being equal, the people are the only ones gaining the most from the IDAs' presence and actions? This is not the case (See note 2.A, above).
[3.A] **p.1, col.2** Agree with the paper that there is a need for "fundamental changes" in the system. However, the paper does not talk about this need, although it does constructively, and often obliquely, refers to the flaws of the current system here and there
[3.B] The paper says that the military GOM rejects international advice and maintains "development policies and priorities, which are partly responsible for the current problems." However, this statement,
(a) understates the destruction to the country and the population wrought by the military GOM's arbitrary rule and repression (by representing it as "development policies and priorities"). It gives the impression that the military GOM was well-intentioned, but things went wrong, anyhow, and
(b) underestimates what it terms "problems". They are not problems. They are major crises, and are owed largely to the military GOM's protracted misrule, etc.
[3.C] The paper states that the military GOM rejects international advice and refuses to change its ways – i.e., to change its "development policies and priorities" (sic). If this is the case, one may usefully ask if there is any point in giving the regime international assistance, even though the bulk of the aid may be intended by donors for the people, not the government? This is a slippery down-slope road to travel.
[3.D] The paper recommends the inflow of international assistance and urge improved monitoring and distribution. To comment, "monitoring" is good sounding, but it is most problematic, all the more so if the IDAs do not have the political will and are moreover fearful of offending the military GOM, or are overly sensitive and responsive to its sensitivities.
[4.A] **p.1, col.2** The paper states that foreign governments and donors should both promote political change and social development. This is a curious statement in the Burma context especially.
What is meant by "social development" is not made clear in the paper, however.
Common sense however tells us that social development is geared to promoting or achieving something better, usually – and more so, nowadays -- political change in the democratic direction, or is meant to.
If such is the case, does the paper mean that the goal of international donors in providing development assistance is to promote political change? Or is the paper saying that the inflow of development assistance will result in or bring about social development and thus political change in Burma (albeit in the very long run)? [ NOTE: The thesis that social development (or, as is often argued, economic development) will bring about political change, although generally valid in the abstract, does not always hold true. This is a very slippery and dubious argument.]
The simple fact of the matter is that the military GOM does not want any change, much less political changes, and wants "development" as it defines it – i.e., maintain its hold on power and achieve greater control and repression capacity.
The question that therefore arises is: will the military GOM allow or welcome social development that is geared to political changes in the democratic direction? In this regard, the paper does acknowledge however that the military GOM does not want any kind of development that will erode the status quo it prefers.
[5] **p.2, col.1** The paper recommends that the main protagonists reassess their position and do their part to generate cooperation and synergy that has been lacking. This seems like a "sound good, feel good" statement.
The military GOM – the military regime – do not want to cooperate with anyone inside the country. It only wants to be obeyed and to maintain tight control. It is quite obvious that the military will not cooperate with anyone – including the IDAs and foreign governments – unless forced to by circumstance or is actively pressured.
A question that should be raised but is not, is what will international actors – governments and donor – do to persuade the military GOM to cooperate with the opposition if or when it (the opposition) wishes or agrees to work with the military GOM as a problem-resolving partner? Another question is, to what length will the international actors go in persuading the protagonists to cooperate?
[6] **Recommendation 1** Even though excellent, the recommendations alone, and the inflow of foreign assistance -- in the "business as usual" or conventional way -- will not persuade the military GOM to go this route. It is not interested in formalizing the current talks, sharing power, nor in including major stakeholders in the political process. What is needed is a firm, focused, and solid international front that does not believe in appeasing the military GOM in the faint or wistful hope that it will become and behave more like a government.
[7] **Recommendation 4** The points mentioned, i.e., the GOM's need to demonstrate a realistic understanding of the problems; minimize the obstructions currently placed on aid organizations; and increase the scope for international actors to work with local NGOs – these are good points. It is however unrealistic to expect much attention to these points from the GOM in particular, and the military in general, in the current situation, and without firm international persuasion.
[8] **Recommendation 6** Most useful. Perhaps NLD leaders inside have not been approached in this regard, requested a detailed policy paper on humanitarian aid.
It is however not clear in this paper on what is meant by "international assistance". See #1, above. [ NOTE: Development assistance was provided the previous GOM (of General Ne Win) in the 1970s. The end result was that it appealed to the international community to grant Burma the status of Least Developed Country in 1987, after claiming for decades that it was developing the country. ]
[9] **Recommendation 7** Ambiguous. What is meant precisely by "state capacity", and which or what kind of state? The context is missing.
In Burma, the state managed by the military – the GOM -- is not neutral, not the government of the people, i.e., it is the creature of the military, highly partisan, excludes broader society, and is not public service oriented. "State capacity" is patently defined by the GOM (and the military brass) as its capacity to maintain power and control, etc. It is most inappropriate therefore for any responsible scholar or well-intentioned group to recommend that the NLD and everyone to strengthen the capacity of the current state.
If by "state capacity" is meant serving the public or the people, there has first of all to be a fundamental political change.
[10] **Recommendation 10** International donors – and international NGOs as well – should certainly work with both the state and broader society forces, but it should be on an equal footing and formally/officially as well.
[11] **Recommendation 17** "Be prepared to lower the standard of transparency and accountability…" Why? This recommendation seems directed at encouraging international aid actors to defer tamely to the GOM, and to accept its arbitrary definition of "sensitive areas", "security", and "confidentiality".
[12] **Recommendations 14-18 (excepting the above)** These are excellent. But it seems that there is lacking political will on the part of outside actors to take on these recommendations in a serious and focused manner. The excellent recommendations, #14-18, are more or less, and in varying degrees, negated or subverted by recommendation #17 above.
Dr. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe tutored at Rangoon University's English Dept. from 1960-62, joined the Shan armed resistance in 1963. He was with the Shan State Army till 1977 and came to Canada in 1985. He went back to school at University of British Columbia to get a Master and a Phd and taught, mostly 3rd year classes, for more than 7 years at UBC and Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada.
ETHNIC POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE UNION OF BURMA
(The following paper is presented by Zo T. Hmung at a Seminar Organized by the Council for Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA) October 25, 2000
Approximately, Burma has a population of 48 million people. Of those 48 million, 68% are Burman, and the rest, 32 %, belong to the ethnic groups such as Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan, etc. This statistics are only the estimated statistics as there is no proper documented information available inside Burma. The ethnic people have their own religions, culture, and languages.
There are different religions such as Buddhism, Muslim, Christianity, and Hinduism. Burmans belong to the majority religion, Buddhism where most of ethnic Chins and Kachins are Christians. The ethnic political issue is important to Burma's politics. Because in order to put an end to civil war, which has spanned over half a century in Burma, the ethnic political crisis must first be resolved in accordance with the full consent of the ethnic minority people. Therefore, Burma's political history, especially how the minority and the majority groups came to live together under the Union government, needs to be addressed. The Formation of the Union Government: To be more precise, I will take an example from Chin history, as I am an ethnic Chin.
In 1886, the British annexed Burma and ruled together with India, from India, known as the British-Burma. At that time, Chin territory was an independent territory with its own political administration, culture, religion, and language, without any outside political interference. Ten years later, in 1896, the British occupied Chin territory and ruled together with Burma and India from India. Before the British's occupation, Chinland had lived independently since time immemorial. In 1937, for administrative convenience, the British divided her administration into two parts known as British-Burma and British-India. Chinland was ruled from British-Burma. On December 20, 1946, Mr. Clement Richard Atlee, then Prime Minister of United Kingdom of Great Britain, proposed granting independence to Burma at the House of Commons.
As a result, Aung San, who led the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), was invited to London to speak on ways to transfer to independence. Unfortunately, the Labor Party government in London had not invited any representatives from the ethnic groups, even though the ethnic people had voiced concern that Aung San could not represent their will concerning their future status with the British government. The British ignored the complaints of the ethnic groups and asked Aung San to gain consent of the Frontier Areas (Frontier areas means ethnic peoples). This unfortunate lack of representation became part of the impetus for the ethnic political crisis that is so evident today. If ethnic groups were given self-determination to choose their own destiny by the Labor Party government in London, today's political histories would be very different from today's ethnic political crisis in the Union of Burma.
The AFPFL had the right to represent the Burmans only, not the ethnic minority groups. AFPFL representative Aung San, for the interim government of Burma, and Clement Richard Atlee, for the British government, signed an agreement on January 27, 1947, for Burma to become an independent country within a year. The second step of political strategy for Aung San was to convince the ethnic groups to join the interim Burmese government during the transitional period, and to later form the Union government based on equal footing of all Union members. In order to convince the ethnic minority to join the interim government of Burma, the AFPFL’s campaign message was to gain independence from the British first, and then to form a Union government together. This campaign message of independence became powerful and convincing as the British had been ruling them for more than half a century. Everyone wanted to gain independence from the British colonial rule. Within a month of Aung San's return from England to Burma, representatives of Burma led by Aung San, along with representatives of the Chin, Kachin and Shan, signed an agreement popularly known as the Panglong Agreement at the Panglong Conference in Shan State on February 12, 1947. February 12 became Union Day in the Union of Burma and is observed as an official holiday in Burma. This clearly indicates how these different groups came together to form the Union country.
The Preamble of the Panglong Agreement said: "The members of the Conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins, and the Chins by their immediate cooperation with the Interim Burmese government" (See the Panglong Agreement). The basic concept of each state administration in federal system of government was evident in the Panglong Agreement. Article 5 of the Agreement said, "full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted" (See Panglong Agreement). A common interest, aimed for mutual benefits, had gathered together the Burmans and the ethnic people to form a Union government. Based on the Panglong conference, the Right of Secession was enshrined in the 1947 Union Constitution, Chapter X. This Right of Secession meant if one of the Union government members did not find benefits, or if they lost benefits within the Union government, that member had the right to depart from the Union government. In my opinion, as the proposed Union belonged to different groups with different territories/countries, the name of the government should not be Burma. It should have a different name, one that could represent all Union members.
Therefore, the Union government, according to the Panglong Agreement, was of the Union government of the Panglong signatories, which was based on trust, faith, and mutual benefits. Kio Mang, a Chin representative from Haka town, Chin State, said he singed the Panglong Agreement because he trusted in Aung San. The spirit of the Union and a trust of each other mattered to the Union-founding members. A Lack of Federalism in the 1947 Union Constitution After the Panglong Agreement, the AFPFL election followed in April. In this very first election, there were 255 seats; 210 seats were for Burmans and only 45 seats went to ethnic groups. Like today's National League for Democracy (NLD), the people mandated AFPFL, led by Aung San, as it was the party that took lead in the independence struggle for the Burmans. The above seats indicated that the Burmans could control the government and drive the Union government in their own way. Chances for the ethnic groups at the central government level were almost nil. However, it was the transitional period and the priority was about independence from British within a year. My assumption is that the ethnic groups did not focus on the importance of the election. In June 1947, Aung San led the drafting of the Union constitution for the future Union government, in accordance with the Panglong Agreement, to be a federal system of governance. Unfortunately, Aung San and his cabinets were assassinated on July 19, 1947, only one month after drafting had begun. U Nu headed the AFPFL continuance of the Union constitution drafting by appointing Tin Tut, Sir Ba U, E Maung, and Kyaw Myint. All were Burmans educated in the law school of Cambridge. U Chan Htoon was appointed as a constitutional adviser. No ethnic group participated in this constitutional drafting process. This process began the question of federalism in the Union of Burma. U Chan Htoon himself admitted that the Union Constitution did not represent the spirit of Union, which was federalism. He said: "Our constitution in theory federal, is in practice unitary". (Tinker, Hugh; "The Union of Burma" :London, 1967, p. 30). On September 24, 1947, the Union Constitution was adopted, becoming effective on January 4, 1948, the date that Burma gained independence. The Union Constitution was not even federal in theory; it was both unitary in theory and practice.
In a unitary system of government, the government is centralized wherein the federal state's powers are placed under the central government's direct control. I would like to take an example from Chin Special Division to show the relationship between the federal state and the central union government. For Chin Special Division, the President of the Union government appointed a Minister for Chin Affairs from a member of the Union government, upon nomination by the Union Prime Minister. The Union Minister member designated as a Minister for Chin Affairs was the head of the government. The power of the Minister's administration for Chin Affairs was subject to the approval by the Union government in all state affairs such as education, culture, etc. Therefore, the Minister was under the direct control of the central Union government. There is the Chin Affairs Council comprising of all members of Parliament elected by the Chin people. The Chin Affairs Council's function was simply to aid and advise the Minister for Chin Affairs in matters such as recruitment, postings, and transferring civil services. Therefore, they too were under direct control of the central Union government. Moreover, there was no provision for passing bills or the right to legislation of the Chin Special Division in the 1947 Union Constitution. This is called a system of centralized government putting every powers in the center. As such, the Chin people and Chin territory were in the hands of the Burmese. (See: 1947 Union Constitution, Part V: Section: 196, 197, 198). Another example is of the Kachin State. Like Chin Special Division, the Kachin had a State Council and a State government. The Minister for Kachin Affairs was the head of the government. Members of the State Council had partial right to pass bills of the state. The problem was, the bills should be presented to the President for approval, and should be subject to the President’s signature, in order to come into existence. And the State can only recommend the passing of the law to the Union parliament. (see Part II- 166-170 of 1947 Union Constitution).
Therefore, both in Chin Special Division and Kachin State, all powers, both in State and central government, went to central government. In federal system of government, the State Council or the federal state should be given full authority to function independently, especially in the case of Burma as it consists of different groups. The federal state should have had the right to legislation, especially in school, police, press, and other individual state affairs. In addition, the constitution should provide for the right of passing bills. Neither the Union government nor the central authorities should control or impose her authorities to federal state council or the state government. Even in the local government, there should be self-government, as there are many different dialects and cultures. The federal government's role should be in the matters of monetary issues, taxation, foreign affairs, communication, and federal armed forces. All these were absent in the Union Constitution of 1947. Therefore, the AFPFL, led by U Nu’s constitution of 1947, aimed to control all power in local, state, and central government. The Burman majority enjoyed all authority from top to bottom and bottom to top. In summary, the 1947 Union Constitution betrayed Aung San's Union as well as the Panglong Agreement. This constitutional crisis led to ethnic groups meeting in Taungyi on February 25, 1961 and submitting a proposal of federalism to parliament. Unfortunately, General Ne Win took power from U Nu, the Prime Minister of the Union government, claiming non-integration of the country on March 2, 1962. The ethnic issues continued to worsen. General New Win's Policy of Burmanization and Ethnic Cleansing Right after his military coup, General Ne Win began using a policy of Burmanization, also known as assimilation, that means making all ethnic groups into Burmans. He abolished the 1947 Constitution and ruled by guns. It was now forbidden to teach or learn ethnic languages in the universities and colleges. Burman cultural dress, such as Taihpung and Longkyi, became the official dress in offices and schools. In Chin State, there is not a single college or university. As result, many Chin people could not pursue higher education and became uneducated. Chins who attended the Mandalay University and Rangoon University were indoctrinated in Burman cultures. This is a calculated assimilation policy of Ne Win to assimilate all ethnic groups into Burmans. As a last resort, more ethnic minority groups took up arms against Ne Win’s dictatorial rule leaving families, relatives and friends behind in an attempt to regain their inherent rights and to safeguard their freedom. Ethnic civilians do not escape the Burmese Army's eye either because the Burmese Army regards them as supporters of the ethnic armed forces. They are subject to torture, imprisonment, and arbitrary arrest along with forced relocation.
In order to escape the Burmese Army's persecution, ethnic groups have fled to other countries for safe haven. The Revolutionary Council, from 1962 to 1974, and the Burma Socialist Program Party, the one party system, did not satisfy the majority of Burmans either. The Military regime not only failed the economic policy of the country, but also spent approximately 40% of the national income for the defense budget in order to strengthen the armed forces to fight against the ethnic armed forces. It had been used for ethnic cleansing activities. Selling her rich natural resources, such as hardwood to neighboring countries including Thailand could not solve the economic crisis. To bail out of the economic crisis, the only choice left was applying for the Least Developed Country status. In 1987, Burma became one of the ten poorest countries in the world. One of the main reasons for the 1988 uprising was freedom from the Burmese dictatorial rule, which included economic freedom, cultural freedom, educational freedom, etc. After the uprising, the regime doubled armed forces along with the doubling of opium production. Production of opium became one of the main sources of income for the Burmese Army. Most of opium production had been taken places in ethnic areas such as in the Wa area of Shan State. This has not only been a threat to Burmans and the ethnic groups, but also to the international community. The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999, released by the Department of State in March 2000, describes Burma as follows: "Burma has been, and continues to be, one of the world's largest producers of illicit opium. Burmese opium production doubled in 1989". (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999 released by the Department of State in March 2000, P. 5). The Burmese military regime regards the ethnic minority groups as the enemy. Two months ago, on August 7, 2000, the Central Executive Committee of the National League for Democracy (NLD) released a four points statement condemning the burning of Chin Christian’s churches, houses, school buildings and live stock. The fourth point of the statement said: "In Burma today, under the rule of the military dictators, if you are not a Burman Buddhist you are discriminated against. The military dictators regard you as an enemy." (Central Executive Committee, National League for Democracy, Statement 124 (8/00), 7 August 2000, Rangoon). This statement truthfully highlights the crux of the political crisis in Burma. For non-Burman groups, and those who oppose the SPDC, life in Burma is full of fear.
Two weeks ago, I was in Guam interviewing an estimated 280 refugees from Burma, mostly from Chin State on human rights issues. One thing that strikes me most concerns Chin girls. I was told that the Burmese Army is targeting Chin girls for marriage. These girls, and their families, obtain more opportunity by marrying members of the Burmese Army, and in the same way Burmese soldiers who marry Chin girls are promoted in rank. Chin women who married Burmese soldiers later received military training at the Football ground in Haka. They are then used to combat the activities of the Chin National Front. These Chin girls are used for both purposes of assimilation and attacking the Chin people. A high school teacher at Haka town, Chin State told me another painful story. One day the Army Captain came to his high school classroom saying that he needed the most beautiful girl in the classroom. Shortly thereafter, a Chin girl was taken to his house where it was later discovered she had been raped. Her family said they were afraid to report the rape to higher authorities knowing there would be no action taken and the family would surely be accused of lying. These acts committed crimes against humanity. Chin State, my State, is a restricted area. Chin-Americans could not travel to Chin State to visit their relatives. Foreigners are also not allowed to visit Chin State. In Chin State, approximately 10% are Burman, they are the Burmese Army and their families. Not less than 90% of the population is Chin people. Ten percent of the population holds power over the will of 90% of the population. The U.N Human Rights Commission’s Rapporteur Rajsoomer Lallah's report on Burma, released on October 16, 2000, said that the worst violence committed by the Burmese Army was against ethnic minorities.
This is about ethnic cleansing. According to the report of the U.S Committee for Refugees 2000 World Refugee Survey, at least 200,000 refugees from Burma live in Thailand, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, and other countries. Approximately, up to one million people are internally displaced. (US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 2000 Page 133). These figures provide a clear picture of the political crisis in Burma, a crisis which is about ethnic discrimination because not less than 90% of those who took refuge outside the country, and those internally displaced, are the ethnic people, not Burmans. The International Community's Role: The United Nations General Assembly has made resolutions on Burma for nine consecutive years. Recently, on October 10, 2000, the U.S Congress passed Resolution H. Con 328 including implementation of the results of 1990 general election. I think the U.N, the U.S, and other governments have a legitimate and powerful role to play in implementing the results of 1990 based on the will of the Burmese people. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) article 21: 3 says, "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government." The people of Burma have expressed their will, voting against the military regime and voting for democracy. The international community has the right to demand that the Burmese military regime transfer power to the 1990 election winners. In addition to the results of the 1990 election, it would also be helpful to concentrate more on the refugee situation and problems of the internally displaced persons inside the country, including ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes committed by the Burmese Army. From a humanitarian ground, the international community has a major role to play in today’s ethnic political problems in Burma. I strongly believe issues such as refugees in border areas, and internally displaced persons, would provide a sense of urgency to the international community, hence speeding up political change in Burma. Issue such as ethnic cleansing could become a spotlight in the efforts to implement the 1990 election and its legitimacy. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Chief Sadako Ogata's recent visit to a Karen refugee camp in the Thai-Burma border area on October 17, 2000 was very encouraging to refugees themselves, the ethnic groups, and the democratic forces, including the international community.
Ms. Ogata shared her insights upon her return from the refugee camp, saying to reporters, "I am sorry to say I was quite shocked." (Sadako Ogata, UNHCR Chief, BurmaNet News, October 17, 2000). Indeed, the SPDC does care about the international community's voice and pressure. They respond to the truth of events by disseminating wrong and untruthful news to the international community. For instance, on October 17, 2000, U Win Aung, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Myanmar to the Millennium Summit in New York, spoke at the Summit saying, "We do no harm to anyone. We do not commit any atrocities". (MYANMAR INFORMATION COMMITTEE, YANGON Information Sheet N0. B-1525(I) 9 September, 2000).
Therefore, the involvement and role of the international community is crucial to motivating political change in the Union of Burma. Lessons from the Past: People should look to the future. However, many lessons are to be learned from the past. One key area is from a Panglong perspective. From a Panglong perspective, the Union existed because of the Panglong signatories. The spirit of Panglong should be restored, respected, and honored because the Union is not of the Burmans alone; rather it is of all ethnic groups. The Union Constitution should also be a federalism giving full functioning power to each state government. Equally important, the Right of Secession should be enshrined in the new Union Constitution. These were dreams of the Union’s founding members. When we look back at the 1990 elections, the NLD won 396 seats out of 485 seats. The SPDC won only 10 seats and the other 79 seats went to independent and ethnic groups.
In accordance with this election rule, Pyithu Hluttaw (People's Assembly) was to form the Union government, which was based upon the size of population. As Burmans are majority in number, it seems that the Union government will always go to the hands of the Burman majority and the ethnic groups will have a hard time defending or proposing their agendas at Union Parliament. Therefore, "drafting the new Union Constitution of Burma will indeed be a crucial question for the future Union of Burma." (Hmung, Zo T; My Vision for Chinland: Chin National Journal, 1997, P. 109).
Conclusion: After the 1988 democratic uprising, both ethnic groups and Burman democratic forces have joined together in the efforts to restore genuine democracy in the Union of Burma. There is hope for the future. This hope should be based on equal footings and equal status of all the Union members. The independence hero, Aung San once said to the ethnic people; "If Burma receives one kyat, you will also get one kyat"(Smith, Martin: "Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity", London, 1991, P. 78). A Kyat is a Burmese currency. In other words, if a Chin gets one dollar, a Burmese also will get an equal amount, which is a dollar. It is about the right to equality. Aung San’s dream for the Union government was based on equality and self-determination. Unfortunately, the AFPFL governments and the Burmese military regime ignored Aung San's dream. I believe Burma’s pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, being the daughter of Aung San, surely knows her father's dream.
By Dr. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe
NOTES #1: THE I.C.G's HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PAPER
N.B. The Executive Summary (pp.1-3) contains all the points and arguments raised in the paper. As such, comments and critical notes of the Executive summary provided herewith, can be regarded as a critique of the whole paper, or as addressing the salient points of the paper as a whole.
ON THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY [referred in the report as "overview"]
[1] First of all, it is not clear in the paper what it means by "international assistance". In the Burma context, is it in reference only to humanitarian assistance or to development assistance as well?
The two are different international aid categories. The paper contributes to the confusion by making no distinction between them, and by going from one to the other in an arbitrary, confusing, and ambiguous manner.
Development assistance in the Burma context is problematic, very much so. Humanitarian assistance on the other hand will however not be as problematic.
The lack of clarity, gives a strong impression that the paper (and the author or authors) is arguing for development assistance, while using the humanitarian assistance point of reference and context. This is what is most troubling about the paper as a whole.
[2.A] **p.1, col.1 and 2, in the Executive Summary** The paper says that international development agencies (IDAs) are making significant difference to the most vulnerable groups (…etc) in Burma.
The above is a sweeping statement, and which may apply perhaps to the Kachin State, to a certain extent. The people in this state and in Burma Proper are, comparatively speaking, not the most vulnerable. The most vulnerable are population living (or hiding) in areas decreed by the military government (military GOM) as BLACK and GREY areas. There is very little presence of the IDAs there because they are – according to the military GOM -- "sensitive" areas, or lacking in security.
The Black and Grey areas are literally free fire zones, and the population are not only IDPs, but treated by military patrols as outlaws, and are therefore at great risk of being killed, raped, etc., at will. They are reduced to living in hiding, and are hunted by the regime's troops, and whatever meager crops they plant for bare survival are destroyed by search-and-destroy patrols or columns. They live lives that are not better than hunted animals.
[2.B] **Site, as above** The paper says that the assistance provided by the IDAs do not have "any significant political cost" vis-B-vis strengthening the regime or undermining the movement for change.
The above raises this question: What is meant by "political costs"? This is a puzzling statement, even meaningless at a deeper level, and lacks proper or defined context.
One could interpret the statement as saying that the IDAs do not make any difference either way, and more importantly, that they (the IDAs) and the assistance they provide are politically neutral. How true or valid is this statement? Can assistance in a context where the government (or the state) is military-run, military-led, illegitimate, and repressive, and wedded to the status quo – opposed to political change -- be politically neutral, or not costly to the movement for change? Or is the paper saying that all things being equal, the people are the only ones gaining the most from the IDAs' presence and actions? This is not the case (See note 2.A, above).
[3.A] **p.1, col.2** Agree with the paper that there is a need for "fundamental changes" in the system. However, the paper does not talk about this need, although it does constructively, and often obliquely, refers to the flaws of the current system here and there
[3.B] The paper says that the military GOM rejects international advice and maintains "development policies and priorities, which are partly responsible for the current problems." However, this statement,
(a) understates the destruction to the country and the population wrought by the military GOM's arbitrary rule and repression (by representing it as "development policies and priorities"). It gives the impression that the military GOM was well-intentioned, but things went wrong, anyhow, and
(b) underestimates what it terms "problems". They are not problems. They are major crises, and are owed largely to the military GOM's protracted misrule, etc.
[3.C] The paper states that the military GOM rejects international advice and refuses to change its ways – i.e., to change its "development policies and priorities" (sic). If this is the case, one may usefully ask if there is any point in giving the regime international assistance, even though the bulk of the aid may be intended by donors for the people, not the government? This is a slippery down-slope road to travel.
[3.D] The paper recommends the inflow of international assistance and urge improved monitoring and distribution. To comment, "monitoring" is good sounding, but it is most problematic, all the more so if the IDAs do not have the political will and are moreover fearful of offending the military GOM, or are overly sensitive and responsive to its sensitivities.
[4.A] **p.1, col.2** The paper states that foreign governments and donors should both promote political change and social development. This is a curious statement in the Burma context especially.
What is meant by "social development" is not made clear in the paper, however.
Common sense however tells us that social development is geared to promoting or achieving something better, usually – and more so, nowadays -- political change in the democratic direction, or is meant to.
If such is the case, does the paper mean that the goal of international donors in providing development assistance is to promote political change? Or is the paper saying that the inflow of development assistance will result in or bring about social development and thus political change in Burma (albeit in the very long run)? [ NOTE: The thesis that social development (or, as is often argued, economic development) will bring about political change, although generally valid in the abstract, does not always hold true. This is a very slippery and dubious argument.]
The simple fact of the matter is that the military GOM does not want any change, much less political changes, and wants "development" as it defines it – i.e., maintain its hold on power and achieve greater control and repression capacity.
The question that therefore arises is: will the military GOM allow or welcome social development that is geared to political changes in the democratic direction? In this regard, the paper does acknowledge however that the military GOM does not want any kind of development that will erode the status quo it prefers.
[5] **p.2, col.1** The paper recommends that the main protagonists reassess their position and do their part to generate cooperation and synergy that has been lacking. This seems like a "sound good, feel good" statement.
The military GOM – the military regime – do not want to cooperate with anyone inside the country. It only wants to be obeyed and to maintain tight control. It is quite obvious that the military will not cooperate with anyone – including the IDAs and foreign governments – unless forced to by circumstance or is actively pressured.
A question that should be raised but is not, is what will international actors – governments and donor – do to persuade the military GOM to cooperate with the opposition if or when it (the opposition) wishes or agrees to work with the military GOM as a problem-resolving partner? Another question is, to what length will the international actors go in persuading the protagonists to cooperate?
[6] **Recommendation 1** Even though excellent, the recommendations alone, and the inflow of foreign assistance -- in the "business as usual" or conventional way -- will not persuade the military GOM to go this route. It is not interested in formalizing the current talks, sharing power, nor in including major stakeholders in the political process. What is needed is a firm, focused, and solid international front that does not believe in appeasing the military GOM in the faint or wistful hope that it will become and behave more like a government.
[7] **Recommendation 4** The points mentioned, i.e., the GOM's need to demonstrate a realistic understanding of the problems; minimize the obstructions currently placed on aid organizations; and increase the scope for international actors to work with local NGOs – these are good points. It is however unrealistic to expect much attention to these points from the GOM in particular, and the military in general, in the current situation, and without firm international persuasion.
[8] **Recommendation 6** Most useful. Perhaps NLD leaders inside have not been approached in this regard, requested a detailed policy paper on humanitarian aid.
It is however not clear in this paper on what is meant by "international assistance". See #1, above. [ NOTE: Development assistance was provided the previous GOM (of General Ne Win) in the 1970s. The end result was that it appealed to the international community to grant Burma the status of Least Developed Country in 1987, after claiming for decades that it was developing the country. ]
[9] **Recommendation 7** Ambiguous. What is meant precisely by "state capacity", and which or what kind of state? The context is missing.
In Burma, the state managed by the military – the GOM -- is not neutral, not the government of the people, i.e., it is the creature of the military, highly partisan, excludes broader society, and is not public service oriented. "State capacity" is patently defined by the GOM (and the military brass) as its capacity to maintain power and control, etc. It is most inappropriate therefore for any responsible scholar or well-intentioned group to recommend that the NLD and everyone to strengthen the capacity of the current state.
If by "state capacity" is meant serving the public or the people, there has first of all to be a fundamental political change.
[10] **Recommendation 10** International donors – and international NGOs as well – should certainly work with both the state and broader society forces, but it should be on an equal footing and formally/officially as well.
[11] **Recommendation 17** "Be prepared to lower the standard of transparency and accountability…" Why? This recommendation seems directed at encouraging international aid actors to defer tamely to the GOM, and to accept its arbitrary definition of "sensitive areas", "security", and "confidentiality".
[12] **Recommendations 14-18 (excepting the above)** These are excellent. But it seems that there is lacking political will on the part of outside actors to take on these recommendations in a serious and focused manner. The excellent recommendations, #14-18, are more or less, and in varying degrees, negated or subverted by recommendation #17 above.
Dr. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe tutored at Rangoon University's English Dept. from 1960-62, joined the Shan armed resistance in 1963. He was with the Shan State Army till 1977 and came to Canada in 1985. He went back to school at University of British Columbia to get a Master and a Phd and taught, mostly 3rd year classes, for more than 7 years at UBC and Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada.
ETHNIC POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE UNION OF BURMA
(The following paper is presented by Zo T. Hmung at a Seminar Organized by the Council for Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA) October 25, 2000
Approximately, Burma has a population of 48 million people. Of those 48 million, 68% are Burman, and the rest, 32 %, belong to the ethnic groups such as Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan, etc. This statistics are only the estimated statistics as there is no proper documented information available inside Burma. The ethnic people have their own religions, culture, and languages.
There are different religions such as Buddhism, Muslim, Christianity, and Hinduism. Burmans belong to the majority religion, Buddhism where most of ethnic Chins and Kachins are Christians. The ethnic political issue is important to Burma's politics. Because in order to put an end to civil war, which has spanned over half a century in Burma, the ethnic political crisis must first be resolved in accordance with the full consent of the ethnic minority people. Therefore, Burma's political history, especially how the minority and the majority groups came to live together under the Union government, needs to be addressed. The Formation of the Union Government: To be more precise, I will take an example from Chin history, as I am an ethnic Chin.
In 1886, the British annexed Burma and ruled together with India, from India, known as the British-Burma. At that time, Chin territory was an independent territory with its own political administration, culture, religion, and language, without any outside political interference. Ten years later, in 1896, the British occupied Chin territory and ruled together with Burma and India from India. Before the British's occupation, Chinland had lived independently since time immemorial. In 1937, for administrative convenience, the British divided her administration into two parts known as British-Burma and British-India. Chinland was ruled from British-Burma. On December 20, 1946, Mr. Clement Richard Atlee, then Prime Minister of United Kingdom of Great Britain, proposed granting independence to Burma at the House of Commons.
As a result, Aung San, who led the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), was invited to London to speak on ways to transfer to independence. Unfortunately, the Labor Party government in London had not invited any representatives from the ethnic groups, even though the ethnic people had voiced concern that Aung San could not represent their will concerning their future status with the British government. The British ignored the complaints of the ethnic groups and asked Aung San to gain consent of the Frontier Areas (Frontier areas means ethnic peoples). This unfortunate lack of representation became part of the impetus for the ethnic political crisis that is so evident today. If ethnic groups were given self-determination to choose their own destiny by the Labor Party government in London, today's political histories would be very different from today's ethnic political crisis in the Union of Burma.
The AFPFL had the right to represent the Burmans only, not the ethnic minority groups. AFPFL representative Aung San, for the interim government of Burma, and Clement Richard Atlee, for the British government, signed an agreement on January 27, 1947, for Burma to become an independent country within a year. The second step of political strategy for Aung San was to convince the ethnic groups to join the interim Burmese government during the transitional period, and to later form the Union government based on equal footing of all Union members. In order to convince the ethnic minority to join the interim government of Burma, the AFPFL’s campaign message was to gain independence from the British first, and then to form a Union government together. This campaign message of independence became powerful and convincing as the British had been ruling them for more than half a century. Everyone wanted to gain independence from the British colonial rule. Within a month of Aung San's return from England to Burma, representatives of Burma led by Aung San, along with representatives of the Chin, Kachin and Shan, signed an agreement popularly known as the Panglong Agreement at the Panglong Conference in Shan State on February 12, 1947. February 12 became Union Day in the Union of Burma and is observed as an official holiday in Burma. This clearly indicates how these different groups came together to form the Union country.
The Preamble of the Panglong Agreement said: "The members of the Conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins, and the Chins by their immediate cooperation with the Interim Burmese government" (See the Panglong Agreement). The basic concept of each state administration in federal system of government was evident in the Panglong Agreement. Article 5 of the Agreement said, "full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted" (See Panglong Agreement). A common interest, aimed for mutual benefits, had gathered together the Burmans and the ethnic people to form a Union government. Based on the Panglong conference, the Right of Secession was enshrined in the 1947 Union Constitution, Chapter X. This Right of Secession meant if one of the Union government members did not find benefits, or if they lost benefits within the Union government, that member had the right to depart from the Union government. In my opinion, as the proposed Union belonged to different groups with different territories/countries, the name of the government should not be Burma. It should have a different name, one that could represent all Union members.
Therefore, the Union government, according to the Panglong Agreement, was of the Union government of the Panglong signatories, which was based on trust, faith, and mutual benefits. Kio Mang, a Chin representative from Haka town, Chin State, said he singed the Panglong Agreement because he trusted in Aung San. The spirit of the Union and a trust of each other mattered to the Union-founding members. A Lack of Federalism in the 1947 Union Constitution After the Panglong Agreement, the AFPFL election followed in April. In this very first election, there were 255 seats; 210 seats were for Burmans and only 45 seats went to ethnic groups. Like today's National League for Democracy (NLD), the people mandated AFPFL, led by Aung San, as it was the party that took lead in the independence struggle for the Burmans. The above seats indicated that the Burmans could control the government and drive the Union government in their own way. Chances for the ethnic groups at the central government level were almost nil. However, it was the transitional period and the priority was about independence from British within a year. My assumption is that the ethnic groups did not focus on the importance of the election. In June 1947, Aung San led the drafting of the Union constitution for the future Union government, in accordance with the Panglong Agreement, to be a federal system of governance. Unfortunately, Aung San and his cabinets were assassinated on July 19, 1947, only one month after drafting had begun. U Nu headed the AFPFL continuance of the Union constitution drafting by appointing Tin Tut, Sir Ba U, E Maung, and Kyaw Myint. All were Burmans educated in the law school of Cambridge. U Chan Htoon was appointed as a constitutional adviser. No ethnic group participated in this constitutional drafting process. This process began the question of federalism in the Union of Burma. U Chan Htoon himself admitted that the Union Constitution did not represent the spirit of Union, which was federalism. He said: "Our constitution in theory federal, is in practice unitary". (Tinker, Hugh; "The Union of Burma" :London, 1967, p. 30). On September 24, 1947, the Union Constitution was adopted, becoming effective on January 4, 1948, the date that Burma gained independence. The Union Constitution was not even federal in theory; it was both unitary in theory and practice.
In a unitary system of government, the government is centralized wherein the federal state's powers are placed under the central government's direct control. I would like to take an example from Chin Special Division to show the relationship between the federal state and the central union government. For Chin Special Division, the President of the Union government appointed a Minister for Chin Affairs from a member of the Union government, upon nomination by the Union Prime Minister. The Union Minister member designated as a Minister for Chin Affairs was the head of the government. The power of the Minister's administration for Chin Affairs was subject to the approval by the Union government in all state affairs such as education, culture, etc. Therefore, the Minister was under the direct control of the central Union government. There is the Chin Affairs Council comprising of all members of Parliament elected by the Chin people. The Chin Affairs Council's function was simply to aid and advise the Minister for Chin Affairs in matters such as recruitment, postings, and transferring civil services. Therefore, they too were under direct control of the central Union government. Moreover, there was no provision for passing bills or the right to legislation of the Chin Special Division in the 1947 Union Constitution. This is called a system of centralized government putting every powers in the center. As such, the Chin people and Chin territory were in the hands of the Burmese. (See: 1947 Union Constitution, Part V: Section: 196, 197, 198). Another example is of the Kachin State. Like Chin Special Division, the Kachin had a State Council and a State government. The Minister for Kachin Affairs was the head of the government. Members of the State Council had partial right to pass bills of the state. The problem was, the bills should be presented to the President for approval, and should be subject to the President’s signature, in order to come into existence. And the State can only recommend the passing of the law to the Union parliament. (see Part II- 166-170 of 1947 Union Constitution).
Therefore, both in Chin Special Division and Kachin State, all powers, both in State and central government, went to central government. In federal system of government, the State Council or the federal state should be given full authority to function independently, especially in the case of Burma as it consists of different groups. The federal state should have had the right to legislation, especially in school, police, press, and other individual state affairs. In addition, the constitution should provide for the right of passing bills. Neither the Union government nor the central authorities should control or impose her authorities to federal state council or the state government. Even in the local government, there should be self-government, as there are many different dialects and cultures. The federal government's role should be in the matters of monetary issues, taxation, foreign affairs, communication, and federal armed forces. All these were absent in the Union Constitution of 1947. Therefore, the AFPFL, led by U Nu’s constitution of 1947, aimed to control all power in local, state, and central government. The Burman majority enjoyed all authority from top to bottom and bottom to top. In summary, the 1947 Union Constitution betrayed Aung San's Union as well as the Panglong Agreement. This constitutional crisis led to ethnic groups meeting in Taungyi on February 25, 1961 and submitting a proposal of federalism to parliament. Unfortunately, General Ne Win took power from U Nu, the Prime Minister of the Union government, claiming non-integration of the country on March 2, 1962. The ethnic issues continued to worsen. General New Win's Policy of Burmanization and Ethnic Cleansing Right after his military coup, General Ne Win began using a policy of Burmanization, also known as assimilation, that means making all ethnic groups into Burmans. He abolished the 1947 Constitution and ruled by guns. It was now forbidden to teach or learn ethnic languages in the universities and colleges. Burman cultural dress, such as Taihpung and Longkyi, became the official dress in offices and schools. In Chin State, there is not a single college or university. As result, many Chin people could not pursue higher education and became uneducated. Chins who attended the Mandalay University and Rangoon University were indoctrinated in Burman cultures. This is a calculated assimilation policy of Ne Win to assimilate all ethnic groups into Burmans. As a last resort, more ethnic minority groups took up arms against Ne Win’s dictatorial rule leaving families, relatives and friends behind in an attempt to regain their inherent rights and to safeguard their freedom. Ethnic civilians do not escape the Burmese Army's eye either because the Burmese Army regards them as supporters of the ethnic armed forces. They are subject to torture, imprisonment, and arbitrary arrest along with forced relocation.
In order to escape the Burmese Army's persecution, ethnic groups have fled to other countries for safe haven. The Revolutionary Council, from 1962 to 1974, and the Burma Socialist Program Party, the one party system, did not satisfy the majority of Burmans either. The Military regime not only failed the economic policy of the country, but also spent approximately 40% of the national income for the defense budget in order to strengthen the armed forces to fight against the ethnic armed forces. It had been used for ethnic cleansing activities. Selling her rich natural resources, such as hardwood to neighboring countries including Thailand could not solve the economic crisis. To bail out of the economic crisis, the only choice left was applying for the Least Developed Country status. In 1987, Burma became one of the ten poorest countries in the world. One of the main reasons for the 1988 uprising was freedom from the Burmese dictatorial rule, which included economic freedom, cultural freedom, educational freedom, etc. After the uprising, the regime doubled armed forces along with the doubling of opium production. Production of opium became one of the main sources of income for the Burmese Army. Most of opium production had been taken places in ethnic areas such as in the Wa area of Shan State. This has not only been a threat to Burmans and the ethnic groups, but also to the international community. The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999, released by the Department of State in March 2000, describes Burma as follows: "Burma has been, and continues to be, one of the world's largest producers of illicit opium. Burmese opium production doubled in 1989". (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999 released by the Department of State in March 2000, P. 5). The Burmese military regime regards the ethnic minority groups as the enemy. Two months ago, on August 7, 2000, the Central Executive Committee of the National League for Democracy (NLD) released a four points statement condemning the burning of Chin Christian’s churches, houses, school buildings and live stock. The fourth point of the statement said: "In Burma today, under the rule of the military dictators, if you are not a Burman Buddhist you are discriminated against. The military dictators regard you as an enemy." (Central Executive Committee, National League for Democracy, Statement 124 (8/00), 7 August 2000, Rangoon). This statement truthfully highlights the crux of the political crisis in Burma. For non-Burman groups, and those who oppose the SPDC, life in Burma is full of fear.
Two weeks ago, I was in Guam interviewing an estimated 280 refugees from Burma, mostly from Chin State on human rights issues. One thing that strikes me most concerns Chin girls. I was told that the Burmese Army is targeting Chin girls for marriage. These girls, and their families, obtain more opportunity by marrying members of the Burmese Army, and in the same way Burmese soldiers who marry Chin girls are promoted in rank. Chin women who married Burmese soldiers later received military training at the Football ground in Haka. They are then used to combat the activities of the Chin National Front. These Chin girls are used for both purposes of assimilation and attacking the Chin people. A high school teacher at Haka town, Chin State told me another painful story. One day the Army Captain came to his high school classroom saying that he needed the most beautiful girl in the classroom. Shortly thereafter, a Chin girl was taken to his house where it was later discovered she had been raped. Her family said they were afraid to report the rape to higher authorities knowing there would be no action taken and the family would surely be accused of lying. These acts committed crimes against humanity. Chin State, my State, is a restricted area. Chin-Americans could not travel to Chin State to visit their relatives. Foreigners are also not allowed to visit Chin State. In Chin State, approximately 10% are Burman, they are the Burmese Army and their families. Not less than 90% of the population is Chin people. Ten percent of the population holds power over the will of 90% of the population. The U.N Human Rights Commission’s Rapporteur Rajsoomer Lallah's report on Burma, released on October 16, 2000, said that the worst violence committed by the Burmese Army was against ethnic minorities.
This is about ethnic cleansing. According to the report of the U.S Committee for Refugees 2000 World Refugee Survey, at least 200,000 refugees from Burma live in Thailand, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, and other countries. Approximately, up to one million people are internally displaced. (US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 2000 Page 133). These figures provide a clear picture of the political crisis in Burma, a crisis which is about ethnic discrimination because not less than 90% of those who took refuge outside the country, and those internally displaced, are the ethnic people, not Burmans. The International Community's Role: The United Nations General Assembly has made resolutions on Burma for nine consecutive years. Recently, on October 10, 2000, the U.S Congress passed Resolution H. Con 328 including implementation of the results of 1990 general election. I think the U.N, the U.S, and other governments have a legitimate and powerful role to play in implementing the results of 1990 based on the will of the Burmese people. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) article 21: 3 says, "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government." The people of Burma have expressed their will, voting against the military regime and voting for democracy. The international community has the right to demand that the Burmese military regime transfer power to the 1990 election winners. In addition to the results of the 1990 election, it would also be helpful to concentrate more on the refugee situation and problems of the internally displaced persons inside the country, including ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes committed by the Burmese Army. From a humanitarian ground, the international community has a major role to play in today’s ethnic political problems in Burma. I strongly believe issues such as refugees in border areas, and internally displaced persons, would provide a sense of urgency to the international community, hence speeding up political change in Burma. Issue such as ethnic cleansing could become a spotlight in the efforts to implement the 1990 election and its legitimacy. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Chief Sadako Ogata's recent visit to a Karen refugee camp in the Thai-Burma border area on October 17, 2000 was very encouraging to refugees themselves, the ethnic groups, and the democratic forces, including the international community.
Ms. Ogata shared her insights upon her return from the refugee camp, saying to reporters, "I am sorry to say I was quite shocked." (Sadako Ogata, UNHCR Chief, BurmaNet News, October 17, 2000). Indeed, the SPDC does care about the international community's voice and pressure. They respond to the truth of events by disseminating wrong and untruthful news to the international community. For instance, on October 17, 2000, U Win Aung, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Myanmar to the Millennium Summit in New York, spoke at the Summit saying, "We do no harm to anyone. We do not commit any atrocities". (MYANMAR INFORMATION COMMITTEE, YANGON Information Sheet N0. B-1525(I) 9 September, 2000).
Therefore, the involvement and role of the international community is crucial to motivating political change in the Union of Burma. Lessons from the Past: People should look to the future. However, many lessons are to be learned from the past. One key area is from a Panglong perspective. From a Panglong perspective, the Union existed because of the Panglong signatories. The spirit of Panglong should be restored, respected, and honored because the Union is not of the Burmans alone; rather it is of all ethnic groups. The Union Constitution should also be a federalism giving full functioning power to each state government. Equally important, the Right of Secession should be enshrined in the new Union Constitution. These were dreams of the Union’s founding members. When we look back at the 1990 elections, the NLD won 396 seats out of 485 seats. The SPDC won only 10 seats and the other 79 seats went to independent and ethnic groups.
In accordance with this election rule, Pyithu Hluttaw (People's Assembly) was to form the Union government, which was based upon the size of population. As Burmans are majority in number, it seems that the Union government will always go to the hands of the Burman majority and the ethnic groups will have a hard time defending or proposing their agendas at Union Parliament. Therefore, "drafting the new Union Constitution of Burma will indeed be a crucial question for the future Union of Burma." (Hmung, Zo T; My Vision for Chinland: Chin National Journal, 1997, P. 109).
Conclusion: After the 1988 democratic uprising, both ethnic groups and Burman democratic forces have joined together in the efforts to restore genuine democracy in the Union of Burma. There is hope for the future. This hope should be based on equal footings and equal status of all the Union members. The independence hero, Aung San once said to the ethnic people; "If Burma receives one kyat, you will also get one kyat"(Smith, Martin: "Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity", London, 1991, P. 78). A Kyat is a Burmese currency. In other words, if a Chin gets one dollar, a Burmese also will get an equal amount, which is a dollar. It is about the right to equality. Aung San’s dream for the Union government was based on equality and self-determination. Unfortunately, the AFPFL governments and the Burmese military regime ignored Aung San's dream. I believe Burma’s pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, being the daughter of Aung San, surely knows her father's dream.
Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid
Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
by International Crisis Group
Since the 1988 uprising and 1990 election in Burma/Myanmar, foreign governments and international organisations have promoted democratisation as the solution to the country’s manifold problems, including ethnic conflict, endemic social instability, and general underdevelopment. Over time, however, as the political stalemate has continued and data on the socio-economic conditions in the country have improved, there has been a growing recognition that the political crisis is paralleled by a humanitarian crisis that requires more immediate and direct international attention. Donors face a dilemma. On the one hand, the humanitarian imperative raises difficult questions about the sustainability of international strategies based on coercive diplomacy and economic isolation, which have greatly limited international assistance! to Myanmar. On the other hand, there is widespread concern that re-engagement, even in the form of limited humanitarian assistance, could undermine the quest for political change and long-term improvements.
This policy dilemma raises two basic questions: Should international assistance to Myanmar be increased? And, if so, how can this be done in a responsible and effective way? This report answers the first of these questions with an unequivocal ‘yes’. There should be more international assistance in Myanmar, more resources, more agencies, and more programs in a wider number of sectors. The human costs of social deprivation in Myanmar are simply too large to be ignored until some indefinite democratic future, which could be years, or even decades, away. In the meantime, international development agencies are making a significant difference bringing relief and new opportunities to vulnerable groups, building local capacities, even helping to rationalise policy-making and planning – and they could do a lot more. Importantly! , so far at least, there are no indications that these efforts are having significant political costs, whether in terms of strengthening the regime or undermining the movement for change.
Those who oppose international assistance, or at least are cautious about it, point out that Myanmar’s development for a long time has been hostage to political interests and that any sustainable, long-term solutions would have to involve fundamental changes in the system of government. They are also concerned that the current government will reject international advice and maintain development policies and priorities that are partly responsible for the current problems.
However, these obstacles should be actively addressed rather than left for some future democratic government to tackle. Instead of placing absolute constraints on international assistance, the focus should be on improving monitoring and distribution to minimise existing problems and facilitate more aid reaching people in need. If properly applied, international assistance could in fact serve to promote political reconciliation and build the social capital necessary for a successful democratic transition.
Foreign governments and donors do not face a choice between promoting political change or supporting social development in Myanmar. Both strategies would have to be integral parts of any genuine effort to help this country and promote stability and welfare for its 50 million people, as well as the broader region. In order to facilitate responsible and effective delivery of more international assistance, all the main protagonists, inside and outside the country, need to reassess their positions and do their part to generate the kind of cooperation and synergy that has so far been lacking.
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO INTERNATIONAL DONORS:
1. Accept that it is not necessary to choose between promoting political change and supporting social development in Myanmar: both strategies need to be part of an integral effort to create stability and improve social welfare.
2. Provide more aid to tackle poverty, illness and the shortfall in education.
3. Work with both local civil society organisations and government bodies to help develop overall capacities for aid management.
4. Strengthen current oversight mechanisms, in particular by setting up an inter-governmental aid consortium with monitoring functions to liase with UN and international non-governmental development organisations (INGO) inter-agency groups in Myanmar.
5. Use aid to attract increased government funding, for example, by ‘matching’ government expenditure in priority sectors and encouraging specific ‘joint-venture’ development projects.
6. Take care that other political tools are wielded with due consideration to their humanitarian and human rights impact – and, for that purpose, commission an impact assessment of all existing and potential future sanctions by a neutral body of economic and development experts.
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MYANMAR:
7. Place a greater emphasis on human development by:
(a) cutting back defence spending and moving more resources to health and education; and (b) reconsidering the current top-down approach to development, which fails to activate all the country’s resources.
8. Facilitate increased international assistance by:
(c) demonstrating clearer commitment to resolving the country’s socio-economic problems by providing more resources and changing policies that do not produce results; (d) minimising the obstructions currently placed on foreign aid organisations in the country; and, (e) increasing the scope for international actors to work with local NGOs.
9. Take more advantage of the wealth of knowledge and development experience outside the country, including in neighbouring countries and among fellow members of ASEAN.
TO THE NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY:
10. Formulate a public plan for international assistance that recognises needs and priorities for expanded humanitarian assistance.
11. Support efforts to strengthen the state's capacity to formulate and implement policy, in preparation for a smooth political transition.
12. Encourage donors and aid organisations to fund local development NGOs and work with community groups.
TO INTERNATIONAL AID ORGANISATIONS IN MYANMAR:
13. Expand the UNDP’s mandate in Myanmar to allow it broader involvement in policy issues and administrative capacity building.
14. Use the significant leverage of the UN system with the government to negotiate a framework more conducive to the effective functioning of all aid organisations in the country, including the INGOs and local civil society organisations.
15. Do more to challenge inaccurate official figures and other data, whether overly pessimistic or optimistic, which distort the situation in the country.
16. Work to maintain current standards of accountability of NGOs as their numbers expand and funding increases, for example, by formalising the INGO Joint Operation Principles and establishing an NGO Council, which could service individual organisations and liase with donors and the national government.
17. Be prepared to lower standards of transparency and accountability in exceptional circumstances, viz. where needed in order to reach people in sensitive areas and sectors where security requires full confidentiality.
18. Strengthen coordination to avoid duplication of projects and pool information and ideas.
Bangkok/Brussels, 2 April 2002
Source: http://www.crisisweb.org/default.cfm
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
by International Crisis Group
Since the 1988 uprising and 1990 election in Burma/Myanmar, foreign governments and international organisations have promoted democratisation as the solution to the country’s manifold problems, including ethnic conflict, endemic social instability, and general underdevelopment. Over time, however, as the political stalemate has continued and data on the socio-economic conditions in the country have improved, there has been a growing recognition that the political crisis is paralleled by a humanitarian crisis that requires more immediate and direct international attention. Donors face a dilemma. On the one hand, the humanitarian imperative raises difficult questions about the sustainability of international strategies based on coercive diplomacy and economic isolation, which have greatly limited international assistance! to Myanmar. On the other hand, there is widespread concern that re-engagement, even in the form of limited humanitarian assistance, could undermine the quest for political change and long-term improvements.
This policy dilemma raises two basic questions: Should international assistance to Myanmar be increased? And, if so, how can this be done in a responsible and effective way? This report answers the first of these questions with an unequivocal ‘yes’. There should be more international assistance in Myanmar, more resources, more agencies, and more programs in a wider number of sectors. The human costs of social deprivation in Myanmar are simply too large to be ignored until some indefinite democratic future, which could be years, or even decades, away. In the meantime, international development agencies are making a significant difference bringing relief and new opportunities to vulnerable groups, building local capacities, even helping to rationalise policy-making and planning – and they could do a lot more. Importantly! , so far at least, there are no indications that these efforts are having significant political costs, whether in terms of strengthening the regime or undermining the movement for change.
Those who oppose international assistance, or at least are cautious about it, point out that Myanmar’s development for a long time has been hostage to political interests and that any sustainable, long-term solutions would have to involve fundamental changes in the system of government. They are also concerned that the current government will reject international advice and maintain development policies and priorities that are partly responsible for the current problems.
However, these obstacles should be actively addressed rather than left for some future democratic government to tackle. Instead of placing absolute constraints on international assistance, the focus should be on improving monitoring and distribution to minimise existing problems and facilitate more aid reaching people in need. If properly applied, international assistance could in fact serve to promote political reconciliation and build the social capital necessary for a successful democratic transition.
Foreign governments and donors do not face a choice between promoting political change or supporting social development in Myanmar. Both strategies would have to be integral parts of any genuine effort to help this country and promote stability and welfare for its 50 million people, as well as the broader region. In order to facilitate responsible and effective delivery of more international assistance, all the main protagonists, inside and outside the country, need to reassess their positions and do their part to generate the kind of cooperation and synergy that has so far been lacking.
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO INTERNATIONAL DONORS:
1. Accept that it is not necessary to choose between promoting political change and supporting social development in Myanmar: both strategies need to be part of an integral effort to create stability and improve social welfare.
2. Provide more aid to tackle poverty, illness and the shortfall in education.
3. Work with both local civil society organisations and government bodies to help develop overall capacities for aid management.
4. Strengthen current oversight mechanisms, in particular by setting up an inter-governmental aid consortium with monitoring functions to liase with UN and international non-governmental development organisations (INGO) inter-agency groups in Myanmar.
5. Use aid to attract increased government funding, for example, by ‘matching’ government expenditure in priority sectors and encouraging specific ‘joint-venture’ development projects.
6. Take care that other political tools are wielded with due consideration to their humanitarian and human rights impact – and, for that purpose, commission an impact assessment of all existing and potential future sanctions by a neutral body of economic and development experts.
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF MYANMAR:
7. Place a greater emphasis on human development by:
(a) cutting back defence spending and moving more resources to health and education; and (b) reconsidering the current top-down approach to development, which fails to activate all the country’s resources.
8. Facilitate increased international assistance by:
(c) demonstrating clearer commitment to resolving the country’s socio-economic problems by providing more resources and changing policies that do not produce results; (d) minimising the obstructions currently placed on foreign aid organisations in the country; and, (e) increasing the scope for international actors to work with local NGOs.
9. Take more advantage of the wealth of knowledge and development experience outside the country, including in neighbouring countries and among fellow members of ASEAN.
TO THE NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY:
10. Formulate a public plan for international assistance that recognises needs and priorities for expanded humanitarian assistance.
11. Support efforts to strengthen the state's capacity to formulate and implement policy, in preparation for a smooth political transition.
12. Encourage donors and aid organisations to fund local development NGOs and work with community groups.
TO INTERNATIONAL AID ORGANISATIONS IN MYANMAR:
13. Expand the UNDP’s mandate in Myanmar to allow it broader involvement in policy issues and administrative capacity building.
14. Use the significant leverage of the UN system with the government to negotiate a framework more conducive to the effective functioning of all aid organisations in the country, including the INGOs and local civil society organisations.
15. Do more to challenge inaccurate official figures and other data, whether overly pessimistic or optimistic, which distort the situation in the country.
16. Work to maintain current standards of accountability of NGOs as their numbers expand and funding increases, for example, by formalising the INGO Joint Operation Principles and establishing an NGO Council, which could service individual organisations and liase with donors and the national government.
17. Be prepared to lower standards of transparency and accountability in exceptional circumstances, viz. where needed in order to reach people in sensitive areas and sectors where security requires full confidentiality.
18. Strengthen coordination to avoid duplication of projects and pool information and ideas.
Bangkok/Brussels, 2 April 2002
Source: http://www.crisisweb.org/default.cfm
DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT TOWARDS FEDERAL UNION:The Role of UNLD in the Struggle for Democracy and Federalism in Burma
DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT TOWARDS FEDERAL UNION:The Role of UNLD in the Struggle for Democracy and Federalism in Burma
By Dr. Lian H. Sakhong, Uppsala University
Introduction The United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD), an umbrella political organization of non-Burman or non-Myanmar nationalities in Burma, was formed in 1988 following the nationwide democracy movement against three decades of General Ne Win's dictatorship. From the very beginning, the UNLD adopted a policy aimed at the establishment of a genuine federal union based on democratic rights for all citizens, political equality for all nationalities and the rights of self-determination for all member states of the Union. It openly declared that democracy without federalism would not solve the political crisis in Burma, including the civil war, which had already been fought, for four decades. Thus for the UNLD, the ultimate goal of the democratic movement in present Burma is not only to restore democratic government but to establish a genuine federal union. In other words, the UNLD views the root of political crisis in Burma today as a constitutional problem ra! ther than a purely ideological confrontation between democracy and dictatorship.
In this paper, I shall explore the role of the UNLD in the on-going struggle for democracy and federalism in Burma. In doing this, attention will be given to the basic principles of federalism and democratic decentralization, which of course is the goal of the movement and the aim of the UNLD. However, instead of presenting a theoretical paper on the basic principles of federalism, I shall focus my attention to the quest for federalism within the historical framework of "religious and ethnic conflicts", so-called, in modern Burma. In this way, I shall argue that the democracy movement in Burma since the military coup d'état in 1962 is the continuation of the "federal movement" during the parliamentary democratic period in the 1950s and early 1960s. The central argument in this paper therefore will run through the military coup in 1962 as "the culmination of political process" stemming from the political crisis during the parliamentary democratic perio! d. I shall then try to point out how and why we can view the role of UNLD in present struggle as the continuation of the Supreme Council of the United Hills Peoples (SCOUHP), which played a leading role in federal movement during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Another way of putting it is to say that what the UNLD is trying to achieve at present is what the SCOUHP attempted even before the military coup in 1962. But because the federal movement led by the SCOUHP was abruptly interrupted by the military coup in 1962, the struggle for democracy and federalism needs to be continued today.
Background History
The Union of Burma is a nation-state of diverse ethnic nations (ethnic nationalities or nationalities), founded in 1947 at the Panglong Conference by pre-colonial independent ethnic nationalities such as the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), Myanmar (Burman), and Shan , based on the principle of equality. As it was founded by formerly independent peoples in 1947 through an agreement, the boundaries of the Union of Burma today are not historical. Rather, the Union of Burma, or Burma in its current form, was born of the historic Panglong Agreement signed in 1947.
In order to understand the complex background of religious and ethnic diversity in Burma, one might firstly note that there is an age-old identification of Burman/Myanmar ethnicity and Buddhism, which has been the dominant ideological and political force in what is today called the Union of Burma or Myanmar. Secondly, there are other ethnic nations or nationalities such as the Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), and Shan, who are Buddhists, but feel dominated by the Burman/Myanmar majority. Thirdly, there are ethnic nationalities who are predominantly Christians within a Baptist tradition. The most prominent Christian groups are the Chin, Kachin and Karen. They -- like the Mon and the Shan -- form ethnic communities which transcend the boundaries of the modern nation-states of Burma, Bangladesh, India, China, and Thailand. The present state of relations between majority Burman/Myanmar Buddhists and minority Christian ethnic groups must be understood against the backgroun! d of colonial history.
The British annexed "Burma Proper", i.e., the Burman or Myanmar Kingdom, in three Anglo-Burmese wars fought in 1824-26, 1852 and 1885. As a result, the British took over Burma Proper in three stages: the Rakhine (Arakan) and Tenasserim coastal provinces in 1826, Lower Burma (previously Mon Kingdom) including Rangoon -- the present capital of Burma -- in 1852, and Upper Burma including Mandalay, the last capital of the Burman Kingdom in 1885. When the last King of Burma, Thibaw, was deposed and exiled to India, the possessions of the Burman Kingdom -- including semi-independent tributaries of the Burman king, such as the Arakan and the Mon -- were transferred to the British. However, this arrangement did not include the Chin, Kachin, Shan and Karenni, who were completely independent peoples, and had never been conquered by the Burman King. Thus, the British separately conquered or "pacified" them during a different period of time. The Chin people, for instanc! e, were "pacified" only ten years after the fall of Mandalay, and their land Chinram, or Chinland, was not declared a part of British India until 1896.
During the colonial period, the British applied two different administrative systems: "direct rule" and "indirect rule". The first was applied to the peoples and areas they conquered together with the Burman Kingdom, i.e., "Burma Proper". "Indirect rule", on the other hand, was applied to the peoples who were "pacified" or added by treaty (the Shan principalities, for example) to the British empire after the annexation of the Burman kingdom. Under the British policy of "indirect rule", the traditional princes and local chiefs of the Chin, Kachin and the Shan were allowed to retain a certain level of administrative and judiciary powers within their respective territories.
In 1937, when the Burma Act of 1935 was officially implemented, Burma Proper was separated from British India and given a Governor of its own. The 1935 Act also created a government structure for Burma Proper, with a Prime Minister and cabinet. The Legislative Council for Burma Proper was also created, although essential power remained firmly in the hands of the British Governor and Westminster. From that time on, Burma Proper was commonly known as "Ministerial Burma". In contrast to this, the term "Excluded Areas" was used to denote the Chin, Kachin and Shan States (Federated Shan States), which were not only subject to "indirect rule", but also excluded from the Legislative Council of Ministerial Burma. The term "Excluded Areas", however, was superseded by the term "Frontier Areas" when the British government created a "Frontier Area Administration" soon after the Second World War.
The Second World War and the Japanese invasion of Burma brought British rule to an abrupt end. Accompanied and helped by the Burma Independence Army (BIA) led by General Aung San (later, U Aung San, upon leaving the armed services), the Japanese easily eliminated the British and captured Rangoon. In May 1942, the Governor of Burma fled to Simla, India, and established the British Burma government in exile there. Having successfully driven the British into India, the Japanese occupied Burma Proper and set up a military administration along their lines of advance.
When the BIA were allowed by the Japanese to be stationed in the Irrawady delta where the majority of the population were Karen, who were loyal to the British, communal violence erupted between the Karen and the Burman. The Japanese ended the bloodbath but only after more than 1,000 Karen civilians lost their lives. Because of that event, a full-scale war broke out between the Karen and the newly independent Burmese government in 1949. This ethnic conflict was the beginning of civil war in modern Burma, in which hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost over more than five decades and which is still in progress. As will be explained, only in the case of the Karen, can the term "ethnic conflict" be applied, but not, for example, the Chin, Kachin, Shan, etc..
After expelling the Japanese, the British returned to Burma in the spring of 1945. They outlined their long-term plan for the future of Burma in the form of a White Paper. This plan provided for a three-year period of direct rule under the British Governor, during which economic rehabilitation from the ravages of war was to be undertaken. Next, the Legislative Council of Ministerial Burma would be restored in accordance with the 1935 Burma Act. Only after the elections had been held under this Act would the legislature be invited to frame a new constitution "which would eventually provide the basis on which Burma would be granted dominion status." For the Frontier Areas, the White Paper provided a means of maintaining the pre-war status quo. The Karenni (Kayah) State was still bound by the pre-colonial treaty as an independent nation. Since the Chinram, the Kachin State and the Federated Shan States were excluded from the administration of Burma Proper, they would, according to the White Paper, have "a special regime under the Governor". When Stevenson became the Director of the Frontier Areas Administration, he even promoted plans to create a "United Frontier Union" for the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Shan and other non-Burman nationalities. However, the plans did not come to fruition as the British Conservative Party of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, lost the general election in 1945.
In the early stage of the post-war period, the British strongly highlighted the rights and interests of the Chin, Kachin, Karen and other non-Burman nationalities from the Frontier Areas who had loyally defended the British Empire during the war. But when the Labour Government came to power, Britain reversed its policy, and Burma's political agenda became largely a matter of bilateral negotiation between the British Labor government and U Aung San's AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League). Thus, in December 1946, the Labor government invited only U Aung San, the undisputed leader of the Burmese nationalist movement. The delegation, which did not include a single representative from the Frontier Areas, went to London to discuss "the steps that would be necessary to constitute Burma a sovereign independent nation." Since Attlee's Labour Government had already prepared to grant Burma's independence either within or without the Commonwealth, the London talk! s were largely a formality, at most putting into more concrete form the principles to which they had already agreed. It might be said -- as Churchill stated in parliament -- the people of the Frontier Area were abandoned by the British and left to salvage what they could of their former independent status with U Aung San and the AFPFL.
The Question of Non-Burman Nationalities
At the London Talks in December 1946, the Burman delegates demanded that "the amalgamation of the Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma should take place at once, and that the Governor's responsibility for the Frontier Areas should end." As noted already, the London Talks was bilateral negotiation between the British Labor government and Aung San's AFPFL without a single representative from non-Burman nationalities. Although there were at least three Karen members in the Constituent Assembly of the Interim Burmese government, none of them were included in the London Talks. Instead, Aung San included several councilors, civil servants and politicians in the delegation. He even included his main rival politicians such as U Saw and Ba Sein.
On the demand of amalgamation of Frontier Areas with the Ministerial Burma, the British countered the AFPFL's demand with the following position: The HMG for their part are bound by solemn undertakings to the people of those Areas to regard their wishes in this matter, and they have deep obligations to those peoples for the help that they gave during the war. According to the information available to HMG the Frontier Areas are not yet ready or willing to amalgamate with Burma Proper.
During the talk, Attlee received a cable from the Shan Sawbwa (princes), through the Frontier Areas Administration and the Governor, stating that Aung San and his delegation did not represent the Shan and the Frontier Areas. Stevenson, Director of Frontier Areas Administration, also cabled to London, saying that, We understand that the Hon'ble U Aung San and the Burman Mission visiting London will seek the control of FA. If this is the case we wish to state emphatically that neither the Hon'ble Aung San nor his colleagues has any mandate to speak on behalf of FA.
In short, Aung San and his delegation had no right to discuss the future of the Frontier Areas. Indeed, it might rightly be said that Aung San and his delegation neither represented nor had the right to discuss the future of the peoples of the Frontier Areas, especially the Chin, Kachin, and Shan because they were independent peoples before the colonial period and were conquered separately by the British, and they were not part of Ministerial Burma (Burma Proper). Aung San could therefore legitimately represent only Burma Proper, or the Ministerial Burma, which belonged to an old Burman or Myanmar kingdom before colonial period. In the pre-colonial period, no Burman or Myanmar King had ever conquered, for instance, the Chin people and their land, Chinram. That was the reason the British had applied two different administrative systems. Thus, when Burma and India were to be given independence by the British, the Chinram was not to be handed over to either India or Burma since it was not annexed by the British as a part of either country. They had the fu! ll right to be a sovereign independent state by themselves when the British withdrew its imperial administration from British India and Burma. In a nutshell, Aung San did not and could not represent the Chin and/or other nationalities from the Frontier Areas without any mandate from the peoples themselves.
During this critical period, U Aung San showed not only his honesty but also his ability for great leadership, which eventually won the trust of the non-Burman nationalities. He acknowledged the fact that the non-Burman nationalities from the Frontier Areas had the right to regain their freedom, independence, and sovereign status because they were not the subjects of the pre-colonial Burman or Myanmar Kingdom. Thus, they had the very right of self-determination: to decide on their own whether they would like to gain independence directly from Great Britain, and to found their own sovereign nation-states, or to jointly obtain independence with Burma, or even to remain as Provinces of the Commonwealth of Great Britain. Aung San reassessed his position and bravely and wisely put his signature to the historic agreement, the Aung San-Attlee Agreement, signed on January 27,1947. This historic agreement spelled out the position of the Frontier Areas vis-B-vis indep! endence that was to be granted Ministerial Burma, as below:
8. Frontier Areas:
( b ) The leaders and the representatives of the peoples of the Frontier Areas shall be asked, either at the Panglong Conference to be held at the beginning of next month or at a special conference to be convened for the purpose of expressing their views upon the form of association with the government of Burma which they consider acceptable during the transition period . . .
( c ) After the Panglong Conference, or the special conference, His Majesty's government and the government of Burma will agree upon the best method of advancing their common aims in accordance with the expressed views of the peoples of the Frontier Areas.
However, on that particular issue of non-Burman nationalities, two members of the Burman delegation refused to sign the Aung San-Attlee Agreement. One was U Saw, the former Prime Minister, and the other was Thakin Ba Sein, who had shared with Thakin Tun Ok the leadership of the minority faction of Dobama Asi-Azone after it split earlier (in 1938). In their view, the clause concerning the Frontier Area in the Agreement carried an implicit threat of "dividing Burma into two parts." Thus, they not only ignored the history of non-Burman nationalities such as the Chin, Kachin and Shan, but also the will of the people from the Frontier Areas. Upon their return to Rangoon, U Saw and Thakin Ba Sein joined Ba Maw and Paw Tun, another former Prime Minister, formed the National Opposition Front, and accused Aung San of having sold out for the sake of holding office. U Aung San, however, was not unduly troubled by the accusations of his political opponents and plunged straight into negotiation with pre-colonial independent nationalities such as the Chin, Kachin and Shan. As mentioned above, the Aung San-Attlee Agreement had left the future of the Frontier Areas to the decision of its people.
Jointly gaining Independence with Burma After having successfully negotiated with the British, U Aung San turned his attention to the non-Burman nationalities and persuaded them to jointly obtain independence with Burma. He promised the frontier peoples separate status with full autonomy within the Burma Union, active participation at the centre within a Senate-like body, protection of minority rights, and the right of secession. He also promised to make the agreed terms into law as guarantee of their right for the future, and told them they need have no fear of the Burman. The negotiations between Aung San, as the sole representative of the interim Burmese government, and the Chin, Kachin and Shan, were held at the Panglong Conference in February 1947.
U Aung San successfully persuaded the Chin, Kachin, and Shan to join Independent Burma as equal, co-independent partners, and the historic Panglong Agreement was thus signed on February 12, 1947. The essence of the Panglong Agreement – the Panglong Spirit -- was that the Chin, Kachin, and Shan did not surrender their rights of self-determination and sovereignty to the Burman. They signed the Panglong Agreement as a means to speed up their own search for freedom together with the Burman and other nationalities in what became the Union of Burma. Thus, the preamble of the Panglong Agreement declares: Believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins, and the Chins by their immediate co-operation with the interim Burmese government.
The Panglong Agreement therefore represented a joint vision of the future of the pre-colonial independent peoples -- namely the Chin, Kachin, Shan and the interim Burmese government led by Chief Minister Aung San, who came into power in August 1946 according to the Burma Act of 1935. The interim Burmese government was a government for the region formerly known as Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma, which included such non-Burman nationalities as the Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), and Karen. The Arakan and Mon were included because they were occupied by the British not as independent peoples but as the subjects of the kingdom of Burman or Myanmar. The Karens were included in the Legislative Council of Ministerial Burma according to the 1935 Burma Act because the majority of the Karens (more than two-thirds of the population) were living in delta areas side by side with the Burmans. Since these peoples were included in the Legislative Council of Ministerial Burma, U Au! ng San could represent them in Panglong as the head of their government. Thus, the Panglong Agreement should be viewed as an agreement to found a new sovereign, independent nation-state between peoples from pre-colonial independent nations of what they then called Frontier Areas and Burma Proper, who in principle had the right to regain their independence directly from Great Britain, and to form their own respective nation-states. In other words, the Panglong Agreement was an agreement signed between the peoples of a post-colonial nation-state-to-be. Ever since the Union of Burma gained independence in 1948, the date the Panglong Agreement was signed has been celebrated as Union Day. The observance of February12th as Union Day means the mutual recognition of the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other nationalities, including the Burmans, as "different people historically and traditionally due to their differences in their languages as well as their cultural life". It is also the recognition of the distinct national identity of the Chin, Kachin, Shan, and other nationalities who had the right to gain their own independence separately and to found their own nation-state separately. In other words, it is the recognition of pre-colonial independent status of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan, and other nationalities as well as their post-colonial status of nation-state-to-be.
Condition Underpinning the Creation of the Union of Burma
According to the Aung San-Attlee Agreement, the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry (FACE) was formed to inquire through an additional and specific consultation about the wishes of the frontier peoples. The British government appointed Col. D. R. Rees-William as Chairman of the FACE. Since the committee conducted its inquiry after the signing of the Panglong Agreement during March and April 1947, the evidence they heard was generally in favour of cooperation with Burma but under the condition of:
Equal rights with Burman,
Full internal autonomy for Hill Areas [ that is, ethnic national states] , and The right of secession from Burma at any time.
The FACE finally concluded its report to the Government that the majority of witnesses who supported cooperation with Burma demanded the "right of secession by the States at any time".
The FACE report, particularly the right of secession, was strongly criticized by such Burman nationalists as U Saw and Thakhin Ba Sein who had earlier refused to sign the Aung San-Attlee Agreement. They accused Aung San of having given up Burman territory and argued that the Frontier Areas were just the creation of the colonial policy of "divide and rule". U Aung San dismissed this criticism as historically unfounded and politically unwise. And he said, "The right of secession must be given, but it is our duty to work and show (our sincerity) so that they don't wish to leave." And in keeping with his promise to the Chin, Kachin and Shan leaders at the Panglong Conference to make agreed term into law, the right of secession was provided for in the 1947 Union Constitution of Burma, Chapter X, Article 201, and 202:
Chapter (X): The Right of Secession
201. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Constitution or in any Act of Parliament made under section 199, every state shall have the right to secede from the Union in accordance with the condition hereinafter prescribed. 202. The right of secession shall not be exercised within ten years from the date on which this Constitution comes into operation.
Although the "right of secession" was put into law in the Union Constitution, Burma did not become a genuine federal union.
The End of Aung San’s Policies of Pluralism and Federalism
At the Panglong Conference in 1947, the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other non-Burman nationalities were promised, as Silverstein observes, the right to exercise political authority of [ administrative, judiciary, and legislative powers in their own autonomous national states] and to preserve and protect their language, culture, and religion in exchange for voluntarily joining the Burman in forming a political union and giving their loyalty to a new state. Unfortunately, U Aung San, who persuaded the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other non-Burman nationalities to join Independent Burma as equal partners, was assassinated by U Saw on July 19, 1947. He was succeeded by U Nu as leader of the AFPFL. When U Nu became the leader of the AFPFL, Burman politics shifted in a retro-historical direction, backward toward the Old Kingdom of Myanmar or Burman. The new backward-looking policies did nothing to accommodate non-Myanmar/Burman nationalities who had agreed to join Independent Burma only for the sake of "speeding up freedom".
As a leader of the AFPFL, the first thing U Nu did was to give an order to U Chan Htun to re-draft U Aung San's version of the Union Constitution, which had already been approved by the AFPFL Convention in May 1947. U Chan Htun's version of the Union Constitution was promulgated by the Constituent Assembly of the interim government of Burma in September 1947. Thus, the fate of the country and the people, especially the fate of the non-Burman/Myanmar nationalities, changed dramatically between July and September 1947. As a consequence, Burma did not become a genuine federal union, as U Chan Htun himself admitted to historian Hugh Tinker. He said, "Our country, though in theory federal, is in practice unitary."
On the policy of religion, U Nu also reversed U Aung San's policy after the latter was assassinated. Although Aung San, the hero of independence and the founder of the Union of Burma, had opted for a "secular state" with a strong emphasis on "pluralism" and the "policy of unity in diversity" in which all different religious and racial groups in the Union could live together peacefully and harmoniously, U Nu opted for a more confessional and exclusive policy on religion. The revision of Aung San's version of the Union Constitution thus proved to be the end of his policy for a secular state and pluralism in Burma, which eventually led to the promulgation of Buddhism as the state religion of the Union of Burma in 1961.
For the Chin and other non-Burman nationalities, the promulgation of Buddhism as the "state religion of the Union of Burma" in 1961 was the greatest violation of the Panglong Agreement in which U Aung San and the leaders of the non-Burman nationalities agreed to form a Union based on the principle of equality. They therefore viewed the passage of the state religion bill not only as religious issue, but also as a constitutional problem, in that this had been allowed to happen. In other words, they now viewed the Union Constitution as an instrument for imposing "a tyranny of majority", not as their protector. Thus, the promulgation of Buddhism as the state religion of Burma became not a pious deed, but a symbol of the tyranny of the majority under the semi-unitary system of the Union Constitution.
There were two different kinds of reactions to the state religion reform from different non-Burman nationalities. The first reaction came from more radical groups who opted for an armed rebellion against the central government in order to gain their political autonomy and self-determination. The most serious armed rebellion as a direct result of the adoption of Buddhism as state religion was that of the Kachin Independence Army, which emerged soon after the state religion of Buddhism was promulgated in 1961. The "Christian Kachin", as Graver observes, "saw the proposal for Buddhism to be the state religion as further evidence of the Burmanization [Myanmarization] of the country," which they had to prevent by any means, including an armed rebellion. The Chin rebellion, led by Hrang Nawl, was also related to the promulgation of Buddhism as the state religion, but the uprising was delayed until 1964 owing to tactical problems. Thus, the Chin rebellion wa! s mostly seen as the result of the 1962 military coup, rather than the result of the promulgation of Buddhism as the state religion in 1961.
The second reaction came from more moderate groups, who opted for constitutional means of solving their problems, rather than an armed rebellion. The most outstanding leader among these moderate groups was Sao Shwe Thaike of Yawnghwe, a prominent Shan Sawbwa who was elected as the first President of the Union of Burma. Although a devout Buddhist, he strongly opposed the state religion bill because he saw it as a violation of the Panglong Agreement. As a president of the Supreme Council of United Hills People (SCOUHP), formed during the Panglong Conference, he invited leaders of not only the Chin, Kachin and Shan, the original members of the SCOUHP, but also other non-Burman nationalities -- the Karen, Kayah, Mon, and Rakhine (Arakan) -- to Taunggyi, the capital of Shan State, to discuss constitutional problems. Unfortunately, these problems still remain unsolved. The conference was attended by 226 delegates and came to be known as the 1961 Taunggyi Conferenc! e, and the movement itself was known later as the Federal Movement.
The Federal Movement in 1961-62
At the Taunggyi Conference, all delegates, except three who belonged to U Nu's party, agreed to amend the Union Constitution based on Aung San's draft, which the AFPFL convention had approved in May 1947, as noted already. At the AFPFL convention, U Aung San asked, "Now when we build our new Burma shall we build it as a Union or as Unitary State?…. "In my opinion", he answered, "it will not be feasible to set up a Unitary State. We must set up a Union with properly regulated provisions to safeguard the right of the national minorities." According to U Aung San's version of the constitution, the Union would be composed of National States, or what he called "Union States" such as the Chin, Kachin, Shan and Burman States and other National States such as Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Mon and Rakhine (Arakan) States. "The original idea", as Dr. Maung Maung observes, "was that the Union States should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs! of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary."
U Chan Htun had reversed all these principles of the Federal Union after Aung San was assassinated. According to U Chan Htun's version of the Union Constitution, the Burma Proper or the ethnic Burman/ Myanmar did not form their own separate National State; instead they combined the power of Burman/Myanmar National State with the whole sovereign authority of the Union of Burma. Thus, while one ethnic group, the Burman/ Myanmar, controlled the sovereign power of the Union, that is, legislative, judiciary, and administrative powers of the Union of Burma; the rest of the ethnic nationalities who formed their own respective National States became almost like the "vassal states" of the ethnic Burman or Myanmar. This constitutional arrangement was totally unacceptable to the Chin, Kachin, Shan who signed the Panglong Agreement on the principle of equality, and also for other nationalities.
They therefore demanded at the 1961 Taunggyi Conference the amendment of the Union Constitution and the formation a genuine Federal Union composed of National States, with the full rights of political autonomy, i.e., legislative, judiciary and administrative powers within their own National States, and self-determination including the right of secession. They also demanded separation between the political power of the Burman/Myanmar National State and the sovereign power of the Union, i.e., the creation of a Burman or Myanmar National State within the Union.
The second point they wanted to amend on the Union Constitution was the structure of Chamber of Nationalities. The original idea of the creation of the Chamber of Nationalities was that it was not only to the safeguard of the rights of non-Burman nationalities but also for the symbolic and real equality, envisaged at the Panglong Conference. Thus, what they wanted was that each National State should have the right to send equal representatives to the Chamber of Nationalities, no matter how big or small their National State might be. In other words, they wanted a kind of Upper House like the American Senate. But what had happened according to U Chan Htun's Union Constitution, was that while all the non-Burman nationalities had to send their tribal or local chiefs and princes to the Chamber of Nationalities; it allowed Burma Proper to elect representatives to the Chamber of Nationalities based on population. Thus, the Burman or Myanmar from Burma Proper, who composed majority in terms of population, were given domination in the Union Assembly.
In this way, the Union Assembly, according to U Chan Htun's version of the Union Constitution, was completely under the control of the Burman or Myanmar ethnic nationality. Not only did the powerful Chamber of Deputy had the power to thwart aspirations and interest of non-Burman nationalities, but the Burmans also dominated even the Chamber of Nationalities. That was the reason the total votes of non-Burman nationalities could not block the state religion bill even at the Chamber of Nationalities. Thus, all the non-Burman nationalities now viewed the Union Constitution itself as an instrument for imposing "a tyranny of majority", not as their protector. They therefore demanded a change of such constitutional injustice at the 1961 Taunggyi Conference. Thus, the Federal Movement and its Taunggyi Conference can be viewed, as noted by a Shan scholar Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, as "a collective non-Burman effort to correct serious imbalances inherent in the constitution! " of 1947.
In response to the demand of the 1961 Taungyi Conference, U Nu had no choice but to invite all the political leaders and legal experts from both Burman and non-Burman nationalities to what became known as the Federal Seminar at which "the issues of federalism and the problems of minorities would be discussed with a view to finding a peaceful solution." The meeting opened on 24 February, 1962 in Rangoon while the parliament was meeting also in regular session. But before the seminar was concluded and just before U Nu was scheduled to speak, the military led by General Ne Win seized state power in the name of the Revolutionary Council in the early morning of 2 March, arresting all the non-Burman participants of the Federal Seminar and legally elected cabinet members, including U Nu himself, dissolving the parliament, suspending the constitution and ending all the debate on federal issues.
The Military Coup in March 1962
Brigadier Aung Gyi, the most powerful but second only to General Ne Win in the Revolutionary Council, stated that the main reason of the military coup in 1962 was "the issue of federalism." The Burma Army, which staged the coup d́état, was "the product of Burman nationalism," as a Shan leader and scholar Chao Tzang Yawnghwe pointed out, "a national sentiment revolving around racial pride and memories of the imperial glories of Burinnong, Alaungpaya and Hsinphyusin, and was very much enraged by the federal movement. They were desperate too, since a successful constitutional reform would undermine the army's supremacy in the non-Burman areas. Moreover, if the constitutional reform was carried out successfully, the Burman would be on the same level as non-Burman nationalities and this certainly was unthinkable for Burman national-chauvinists like Ne Win and Aung Gyi.
Although the Burma Army was originally established by Aung San as the BIA (Burma Independence Army) during the Second World War, two factions from very different backgrounds made up the Thirty Comrades, the core of the BIA. "Twenty-two of the young comrades were followers of the old writer and national hero, Thakhin Kodaw Hmaing" and were later known as "Kodaw Hmaing-Aung San faction". But another eight, including Ne Win, came from the "Ba Sein-Tun Oke faction." As noted already, Ba Sein refused to sign the Aung San-Attlee Agreement, mainly because of non-Burman nationalities issues on which he could not agree with U Aung San. As a matter of the fact, while Aung San had officially recognized, by signing that agreement, the pre-colonial independent status of the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other non-Burman nationalities, and their right to regain independence directly from Great Britain and their right to form their own respective sovereign nation-states without a! ny mutual attachment to Burma, Ba Sein and his fellow U Saw, who later killed Aung San, could not recognize historical truth and refused to sign that agreement in 1947. They also accused U Aung San of being a traitor of Burman traditional nationalism, and they went about saying that Burma had been sold down the river by Aung San. Hence, General Ne Win and Brigadier Aung Gyi, as the most faithful disciples of the Ba Sein-Tun Oke Burman national-chauvinist faction, reclaimed their vision of Burma -- which in their view U Aung San betrayed. And they promulgated the Unitary State Constitution in 1974 by force.
Ever since the chauvinistic Burma Army launched a full range of "Myanmarization" measures under the leadership of General Ne Win, the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Rakhine (Arakan), Shan and other non-Burman nationalities have had no choice but to struggle for their survival by any means, including the use of arms. Today almost all non-Burman nationalities are fighting against the central government in order to gain full political autonomy and self-determination within the Union of Burma. Thus, the civil war in Burma which began at the time of independence intensified under General Ne Win's military dictatorship and his successor, the present military junta, which came into power in 1988, in order to suppress the nation-wide popular uprising for a democratic change.
Struggle for the Second Independence
As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi correctly points out, the struggle for democracy, equality and self-determination in present Burma is the struggle for the second independence of Burma because what Burma's leaders tried hard to achieve in the first independence movement had all been coercively negated by General Ne Win in the 1962 military coup. Moreover, the 1962 military coup abruptly interrupted the federal movement, which indeed was a struggle for the reformation of a genuine federal union in accordance with the Panglong Agreement and Spirit. Thus, the nation-wide democratic movement in 1988 can be seen as the struggle for the second independence, especially as the revival of the spirit of Panglong. Likewise, the formation of the UNLD can be viewed as the continuation of federal movements in 1950s and 1960s, then led by the SCOUHP.
In order to achieve the goal of the struggle for the second independence, the UNLD therefore adopted the following policies as its objectives: (1) To establish a genuine federal union.
(2) To guarantee democratic rights, political equality, and self-determination for all nationalities of the Union.
(3) To build a firm unity of all nationalities in the Union based on the principles of equality and justice.
(4) To promote the development of all member states of the Union.
(5) To abolish all types totalitarianism in Burma.
(6) To establish internal peace and tranquility through dialogue.
The UNLD believes that for building a genuine federal union, the Union constitution must be based on a democratic administrative system, because as noted by a Shan analyst, "….democracy is an essential pre-condition for federalism. Federalism will not work in a polity where there is no democracy because federalism is, at the bottom, about decentralization of power and limits placed on power. In federalism the above is achieved via a set of arrangement that limits and divides or disperses power, so that parts of the whole are empowered and are further enabled to check central power and prevent the concentration of power." In short, democracy and federalism are inseparable, as head and tail of a coin, in a pluralistic and multi-ethnic country like Burma.
The Basic Principles of Federal Union
On the formation of a genuine Federal Union, the UNLD has adopted seven principles of federalism for the future constitution of the Federal Union of Burma, at its conference held in Rangoon, on June 29 - July 2, 1990. These seven principles are:
The constitution of the Federal Union of Burma shall be formed in accordance with the principles of federalism and democratic decentralization. The Union Constitution shall guarantee the democratic rights of citizens of Burma including the principles contain in the United Nation's declaration of universal human rights.
The Union Constitution shall guarantee political equality among all ethnic national states of the Federal Union of Burma.
The Federal Union of Burma shall be composed of National States; and all National States of the Union shall be constituted in terms of ethnicity, rather than geographical areas. There must be at least eight National States, namely, Chin State, Kachin State, Karen State, Kaya State, Mon State, Myanmar or Burma State, Rakhine (Arakan State), and Shan State.
The Union Assembly shall be consisting of two legislative chambers: the Chamber of Nationalities (Upper House) and the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House). The Chamber of Nationalities (Upper House) shall be composed of equal numbers of elected representatives from the respective National States; and The Chamber of Deputies (Lower House) shall be composed of elected representatives from the respective constituencies of the peoples.
The creation of Chamber of Nationalities based on equal representation of the member states of the Union is intended to safeguard the rights of National States and minorities in the Union government. It also intended as a symbol and instrument of the principle of equality among all nationalities of the Union. In addition to the Union Assembly, all member states of the Union shall form their own separate Legislative Assemblies for their respective National States. In Federalism there must be a clear separation of Union Assembly, or Federal Parliament, from the Legislative Assemblies of the member states of the Union. Moreover, the residual powers, that is, all powers, except those given by member states to the federal center, or the Union, must be vested in the Legislative Assembly of the National State. In this way, the Union Constitution automatically allocates political authority of legislative, judiciary, and administrative powers to the Legislative Assembly of the National States. Thus, all member states of the Union can freely exercise the right of self-determination through the right of self-government within their respective National States.
The Sovereignty of the Union shall be vested in the people of the Union of Burma, and shall be exercised by the Union Assembly. Moreover, the central government of the Federal Union shall have authority to decide on action for: (i) monetary system, (ii) defense, (iii) foreign relation, and (iv) other authorities which temporarily vested in the central government of Federal Union by member states of the Union.
UNLD Policies concerning the Power Transition
After the election held in May 1990, the UNLD adopted some policies to be applied during the power transition from an authoritarian military junta to a democratically elected government. Among them: (1) tripartite dialogue, (2) national reconciliation, and (3) national convention. In this paper I shall discuss briefly the need for national convention and tripartite dialogue, the policies adopted by the UNLD at the conference held in Rangoon from June 29-July 2, 1990. I shall, however, omit in this paper the policy of National Reconciliation, the program that is mainly conducted by the UNLD in exile together with other democratic forces, such as NCGUB, NCUB, NDF, and others.
(a) UNLD for Tripartite Dialogue
From the very beginning, the UNLD has opted for a non-violent political transition in Burma, from military dictatorship to a democratic open society. The UNLD believes that Democracy is the only form of sustainable governance which guarantees both individual citizens and national and cultural collectivities in Burma the rights of full participation in the development of social, economic, and cultural resources available to all citizens of the Union. Enduring democracy therefore requires the active participation of all the citizens -- as individual citizens and as members of an ethnic-cultural collectivity -- to build and renovate not only the democratic institutions but also the structure of the Union itself, which shall balance the different interests of nationalities for the common good of all member states of the Union.
As the UNLD believe in democratic principles and the rights of full participation of all nationalities in the process of nation rebuilding, the UNLD demands dialogue as an integral part of the political transition, not only in the process of power transformation from military rule to a democratically elected body, but also in the entire process of democratization, which includes the restructuring of the Union into a federal system. Therefore, in the processes of both power transformation and democratization, dialogue must be the main instrument for bringing all individual citizens and collective members of nationalities of the Union together at all levels.
After the general election in 1990, the UNLD believed that at least two levels of dialogue might be necessary to achieve the goal of the creation of democratic open society and the establishment of a genuine Federal Union. The first step of dialogue is for power transformation, and the second step, which is more important than the first level, will be for the entire process of democratization and the restructuring of the Union into a federal system. The UNLD also believes that since the NLD had received the trust of the people in a landslide victory of the 1990 election, a dialogue for "transformation of power" should be a dialogue between the NLD led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the military junta, the de fecto government of present Burma. However, the nature of such dialogue at the first level must focus only on the transition of state powers into a democratically elected body. In other words, it will be a dialogue for administrative power but not for legislative power or constitutional matter. The core of dialogue at that level therefore is just for a "breakthrough" of political stagnation, which have created a number of political and social crises in today Burma.
The UNLD strongly believes that political crisis in Burma today is not just a conflict between dictatorship and democracy. It involves an unmanaged and neglected conflict, including a civil war that has consumed many lives and resources of the country for five decades. The root of civil war in Burma is the conflict over power-sharing between the central government, which so far has been controlled by one ethnic group called Myanmar or Burman, and all National States of the Union. In other words, the root of the problem is, as mentioned already, a constitutional problem or more specifically, the rights of self-determination for non-Burman nationalities who joined the Union as equal partners in 1947. Indeed, most nationalities in Burma are now fighting for rightful self-determination and autonomous status of their respective National States within the Union. Since they were not able to resolve their problems through dialogue, they have no choice but to attempt! to solve their disputes through violent means of civil war.
In order to avoid further bloodshed and violence during the political transition, the UNLD believes that the second level of dialogue must start almost simultaneously with the first level of dialogue. The aim of dialogue at the second level is to solve the entire political crisis in Burma and to end five long decades of civil war through the creation of a genuine Federal Union. The UNLD believes that without a genuine Federal Union there is no means of ending the civil war in Burma. Without ending the civil war, there is no means of establishing a democratic system either. Thus, the participation of all ethnic nationalities in the political transition is the most important element in the entire process of democratization and restructuring the Union into a federal system. They all have the right to participate in this important process of restructuring the Union. Thus, dialogue at that level must no longer be a two-way dialogue but a Tri-partite dialog! ue, which shall include three forces, namely the forces composed of the non-Burman nationalities, the democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the military junta.
(b) The Need for a National Convention
On June 29 to July 2, 1990, the UNLD held its conference at the YMCA Hall in Rangoon. At that conference, all the members of the UNLD unanimously adopted a policy on national convention that states that in order to lay down the general guidelines of a federal constitution which will serve as the foundation on which to build a new democratic society for the future Federal Union, a National Consultative Convention shall be convened, similar to the Panglong Conference. As UNLD had adopted from the start a policy for the restoration of "internal peace and tranquility through dialogue," it was envisaged that such a National Consultative Convention will ensure peace, unity and equality for all nationalities of the Union. Alternatively, it could be said that the National Consultative Convention would serve as a kind of peace talks aiming at ending the civil war, which had consumed many lives and the country’s resources for five decades.
The UNLD consulted issue of the National Consultative Convention with the NLD, the winner of the general election in 1990. On August 29,1990, the UNLD and the NLD made a joint declaration known as Bo Aung Kyaw Street Declaration. Some of the points included in this declaration were:
(i) After the emergence of the Pyithu Hluttaw (Union Assembly or Federal Parliament), this Hluttaw shall form the elected government at the earliest time, then the Pyithu Hluttaw shall organize to convene a "National Consultative Convention" consisting of the representatives from all the nationalities, and other personages that are deemed necessary to take part in this convention. This convention shall lay down general guidelines for the Constitution of the Union. The Pyithu Hluttaw shall draw up, approve, and enact the constitution of the Union in compliance with above general guidelines.
(ii) All nationalities shall have full rights of equality, racially as well as politically, and, in addition to having the full rights of self-determination, it is necessary to build a Union with a unity of all the nationalities which guarantees democracy and basic human rights.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that the democratic movement in Burma since1962 was the continuation of the federal movement led by the SCOUHP in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At the same time I have highlighted the fact that the role of the UNLD in the struggle for democracy and federalism is the continuation of a political role undertaken by the SCOUHP in the federal movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The only difference between the SCOUHP and the UNLD is neither the policy nor the goal, but the political situation. In the early 1960s, the Federal Movement was seen mainly as a separatist movement by the majority ethnic Burmese (Burman). Thus, the non-Burman nationalities under the leadership of the SCOUHP did not receive enough support from their fellow citizens, the Burman majority. At the Taunggyi Conference, for instance, three delegates who belonged to U Nu's Party were against the move for the formation of a genuine federal union, despite the ! fact that they all were non-Burman politicians.
By contrast, the movement for federalism is now seen as the movement for equality. The UNLD non enjoys strong support from all the democratic forces in Burma, especially the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) headed by Dr. Sein Win, the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), the National Democratic Fronts (NDF), the All Burma Students' Democratic Fronts (ABSDF), and other democratic forces. They all agree that the ultimate goal of democratic movement in Burma is the establishment of a genuine federal union, where all indigenous nationalities can live peacefully together. This unity in the same policy is the best hope not only for the UNLD but also for the future of the entire Federal Union of Burma.
BIBLIOGRPHY
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By Dr. Lian H. Sakhong, Uppsala University
Introduction The United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD), an umbrella political organization of non-Burman or non-Myanmar nationalities in Burma, was formed in 1988 following the nationwide democracy movement against three decades of General Ne Win's dictatorship. From the very beginning, the UNLD adopted a policy aimed at the establishment of a genuine federal union based on democratic rights for all citizens, political equality for all nationalities and the rights of self-determination for all member states of the Union. It openly declared that democracy without federalism would not solve the political crisis in Burma, including the civil war, which had already been fought, for four decades. Thus for the UNLD, the ultimate goal of the democratic movement in present Burma is not only to restore democratic government but to establish a genuine federal union. In other words, the UNLD views the root of political crisis in Burma today as a constitutional problem ra! ther than a purely ideological confrontation between democracy and dictatorship.
In this paper, I shall explore the role of the UNLD in the on-going struggle for democracy and federalism in Burma. In doing this, attention will be given to the basic principles of federalism and democratic decentralization, which of course is the goal of the movement and the aim of the UNLD. However, instead of presenting a theoretical paper on the basic principles of federalism, I shall focus my attention to the quest for federalism within the historical framework of "religious and ethnic conflicts", so-called, in modern Burma. In this way, I shall argue that the democracy movement in Burma since the military coup d'état in 1962 is the continuation of the "federal movement" during the parliamentary democratic period in the 1950s and early 1960s. The central argument in this paper therefore will run through the military coup in 1962 as "the culmination of political process" stemming from the political crisis during the parliamentary democratic perio! d. I shall then try to point out how and why we can view the role of UNLD in present struggle as the continuation of the Supreme Council of the United Hills Peoples (SCOUHP), which played a leading role in federal movement during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Another way of putting it is to say that what the UNLD is trying to achieve at present is what the SCOUHP attempted even before the military coup in 1962. But because the federal movement led by the SCOUHP was abruptly interrupted by the military coup in 1962, the struggle for democracy and federalism needs to be continued today.
Background History
The Union of Burma is a nation-state of diverse ethnic nations (ethnic nationalities or nationalities), founded in 1947 at the Panglong Conference by pre-colonial independent ethnic nationalities such as the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), Myanmar (Burman), and Shan , based on the principle of equality. As it was founded by formerly independent peoples in 1947 through an agreement, the boundaries of the Union of Burma today are not historical. Rather, the Union of Burma, or Burma in its current form, was born of the historic Panglong Agreement signed in 1947.
In order to understand the complex background of religious and ethnic diversity in Burma, one might firstly note that there is an age-old identification of Burman/Myanmar ethnicity and Buddhism, which has been the dominant ideological and political force in what is today called the Union of Burma or Myanmar. Secondly, there are other ethnic nations or nationalities such as the Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), and Shan, who are Buddhists, but feel dominated by the Burman/Myanmar majority. Thirdly, there are ethnic nationalities who are predominantly Christians within a Baptist tradition. The most prominent Christian groups are the Chin, Kachin and Karen. They -- like the Mon and the Shan -- form ethnic communities which transcend the boundaries of the modern nation-states of Burma, Bangladesh, India, China, and Thailand. The present state of relations between majority Burman/Myanmar Buddhists and minority Christian ethnic groups must be understood against the backgroun! d of colonial history.
The British annexed "Burma Proper", i.e., the Burman or Myanmar Kingdom, in three Anglo-Burmese wars fought in 1824-26, 1852 and 1885. As a result, the British took over Burma Proper in three stages: the Rakhine (Arakan) and Tenasserim coastal provinces in 1826, Lower Burma (previously Mon Kingdom) including Rangoon -- the present capital of Burma -- in 1852, and Upper Burma including Mandalay, the last capital of the Burman Kingdom in 1885. When the last King of Burma, Thibaw, was deposed and exiled to India, the possessions of the Burman Kingdom -- including semi-independent tributaries of the Burman king, such as the Arakan and the Mon -- were transferred to the British. However, this arrangement did not include the Chin, Kachin, Shan and Karenni, who were completely independent peoples, and had never been conquered by the Burman King. Thus, the British separately conquered or "pacified" them during a different period of time. The Chin people, for instanc! e, were "pacified" only ten years after the fall of Mandalay, and their land Chinram, or Chinland, was not declared a part of British India until 1896.
During the colonial period, the British applied two different administrative systems: "direct rule" and "indirect rule". The first was applied to the peoples and areas they conquered together with the Burman Kingdom, i.e., "Burma Proper". "Indirect rule", on the other hand, was applied to the peoples who were "pacified" or added by treaty (the Shan principalities, for example) to the British empire after the annexation of the Burman kingdom. Under the British policy of "indirect rule", the traditional princes and local chiefs of the Chin, Kachin and the Shan were allowed to retain a certain level of administrative and judiciary powers within their respective territories.
In 1937, when the Burma Act of 1935 was officially implemented, Burma Proper was separated from British India and given a Governor of its own. The 1935 Act also created a government structure for Burma Proper, with a Prime Minister and cabinet. The Legislative Council for Burma Proper was also created, although essential power remained firmly in the hands of the British Governor and Westminster. From that time on, Burma Proper was commonly known as "Ministerial Burma". In contrast to this, the term "Excluded Areas" was used to denote the Chin, Kachin and Shan States (Federated Shan States), which were not only subject to "indirect rule", but also excluded from the Legislative Council of Ministerial Burma. The term "Excluded Areas", however, was superseded by the term "Frontier Areas" when the British government created a "Frontier Area Administration" soon after the Second World War.
The Second World War and the Japanese invasion of Burma brought British rule to an abrupt end. Accompanied and helped by the Burma Independence Army (BIA) led by General Aung San (later, U Aung San, upon leaving the armed services), the Japanese easily eliminated the British and captured Rangoon. In May 1942, the Governor of Burma fled to Simla, India, and established the British Burma government in exile there. Having successfully driven the British into India, the Japanese occupied Burma Proper and set up a military administration along their lines of advance.
When the BIA were allowed by the Japanese to be stationed in the Irrawady delta where the majority of the population were Karen, who were loyal to the British, communal violence erupted between the Karen and the Burman. The Japanese ended the bloodbath but only after more than 1,000 Karen civilians lost their lives. Because of that event, a full-scale war broke out between the Karen and the newly independent Burmese government in 1949. This ethnic conflict was the beginning of civil war in modern Burma, in which hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost over more than five decades and which is still in progress. As will be explained, only in the case of the Karen, can the term "ethnic conflict" be applied, but not, for example, the Chin, Kachin, Shan, etc..
After expelling the Japanese, the British returned to Burma in the spring of 1945. They outlined their long-term plan for the future of Burma in the form of a White Paper. This plan provided for a three-year period of direct rule under the British Governor, during which economic rehabilitation from the ravages of war was to be undertaken. Next, the Legislative Council of Ministerial Burma would be restored in accordance with the 1935 Burma Act. Only after the elections had been held under this Act would the legislature be invited to frame a new constitution "which would eventually provide the basis on which Burma would be granted dominion status." For the Frontier Areas, the White Paper provided a means of maintaining the pre-war status quo. The Karenni (Kayah) State was still bound by the pre-colonial treaty as an independent nation. Since the Chinram, the Kachin State and the Federated Shan States were excluded from the administration of Burma Proper, they would, according to the White Paper, have "a special regime under the Governor". When Stevenson became the Director of the Frontier Areas Administration, he even promoted plans to create a "United Frontier Union" for the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Shan and other non-Burman nationalities. However, the plans did not come to fruition as the British Conservative Party of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, lost the general election in 1945.
In the early stage of the post-war period, the British strongly highlighted the rights and interests of the Chin, Kachin, Karen and other non-Burman nationalities from the Frontier Areas who had loyally defended the British Empire during the war. But when the Labour Government came to power, Britain reversed its policy, and Burma's political agenda became largely a matter of bilateral negotiation between the British Labor government and U Aung San's AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League). Thus, in December 1946, the Labor government invited only U Aung San, the undisputed leader of the Burmese nationalist movement. The delegation, which did not include a single representative from the Frontier Areas, went to London to discuss "the steps that would be necessary to constitute Burma a sovereign independent nation." Since Attlee's Labour Government had already prepared to grant Burma's independence either within or without the Commonwealth, the London talk! s were largely a formality, at most putting into more concrete form the principles to which they had already agreed. It might be said -- as Churchill stated in parliament -- the people of the Frontier Area were abandoned by the British and left to salvage what they could of their former independent status with U Aung San and the AFPFL.
The Question of Non-Burman Nationalities
At the London Talks in December 1946, the Burman delegates demanded that "the amalgamation of the Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma should take place at once, and that the Governor's responsibility for the Frontier Areas should end." As noted already, the London Talks was bilateral negotiation between the British Labor government and Aung San's AFPFL without a single representative from non-Burman nationalities. Although there were at least three Karen members in the Constituent Assembly of the Interim Burmese government, none of them were included in the London Talks. Instead, Aung San included several councilors, civil servants and politicians in the delegation. He even included his main rival politicians such as U Saw and Ba Sein.
On the demand of amalgamation of Frontier Areas with the Ministerial Burma, the British countered the AFPFL's demand with the following position: The HMG for their part are bound by solemn undertakings to the people of those Areas to regard their wishes in this matter, and they have deep obligations to those peoples for the help that they gave during the war. According to the information available to HMG the Frontier Areas are not yet ready or willing to amalgamate with Burma Proper.
During the talk, Attlee received a cable from the Shan Sawbwa (princes), through the Frontier Areas Administration and the Governor, stating that Aung San and his delegation did not represent the Shan and the Frontier Areas. Stevenson, Director of Frontier Areas Administration, also cabled to London, saying that, We understand that the Hon'ble U Aung San and the Burman Mission visiting London will seek the control of FA. If this is the case we wish to state emphatically that neither the Hon'ble Aung San nor his colleagues has any mandate to speak on behalf of FA.
In short, Aung San and his delegation had no right to discuss the future of the Frontier Areas. Indeed, it might rightly be said that Aung San and his delegation neither represented nor had the right to discuss the future of the peoples of the Frontier Areas, especially the Chin, Kachin, and Shan because they were independent peoples before the colonial period and were conquered separately by the British, and they were not part of Ministerial Burma (Burma Proper). Aung San could therefore legitimately represent only Burma Proper, or the Ministerial Burma, which belonged to an old Burman or Myanmar kingdom before colonial period. In the pre-colonial period, no Burman or Myanmar King had ever conquered, for instance, the Chin people and their land, Chinram. That was the reason the British had applied two different administrative systems. Thus, when Burma and India were to be given independence by the British, the Chinram was not to be handed over to either India or Burma since it was not annexed by the British as a part of either country. They had the fu! ll right to be a sovereign independent state by themselves when the British withdrew its imperial administration from British India and Burma. In a nutshell, Aung San did not and could not represent the Chin and/or other nationalities from the Frontier Areas without any mandate from the peoples themselves.
During this critical period, U Aung San showed not only his honesty but also his ability for great leadership, which eventually won the trust of the non-Burman nationalities. He acknowledged the fact that the non-Burman nationalities from the Frontier Areas had the right to regain their freedom, independence, and sovereign status because they were not the subjects of the pre-colonial Burman or Myanmar Kingdom. Thus, they had the very right of self-determination: to decide on their own whether they would like to gain independence directly from Great Britain, and to found their own sovereign nation-states, or to jointly obtain independence with Burma, or even to remain as Provinces of the Commonwealth of Great Britain. Aung San reassessed his position and bravely and wisely put his signature to the historic agreement, the Aung San-Attlee Agreement, signed on January 27,1947. This historic agreement spelled out the position of the Frontier Areas vis-B-vis indep! endence that was to be granted Ministerial Burma, as below:
8. Frontier Areas:
( b ) The leaders and the representatives of the peoples of the Frontier Areas shall be asked, either at the Panglong Conference to be held at the beginning of next month or at a special conference to be convened for the purpose of expressing their views upon the form of association with the government of Burma which they consider acceptable during the transition period . . .
( c ) After the Panglong Conference, or the special conference, His Majesty's government and the government of Burma will agree upon the best method of advancing their common aims in accordance with the expressed views of the peoples of the Frontier Areas.
However, on that particular issue of non-Burman nationalities, two members of the Burman delegation refused to sign the Aung San-Attlee Agreement. One was U Saw, the former Prime Minister, and the other was Thakin Ba Sein, who had shared with Thakin Tun Ok the leadership of the minority faction of Dobama Asi-Azone after it split earlier (in 1938). In their view, the clause concerning the Frontier Area in the Agreement carried an implicit threat of "dividing Burma into two parts." Thus, they not only ignored the history of non-Burman nationalities such as the Chin, Kachin and Shan, but also the will of the people from the Frontier Areas. Upon their return to Rangoon, U Saw and Thakin Ba Sein joined Ba Maw and Paw Tun, another former Prime Minister, formed the National Opposition Front, and accused Aung San of having sold out for the sake of holding office. U Aung San, however, was not unduly troubled by the accusations of his political opponents and plunged straight into negotiation with pre-colonial independent nationalities such as the Chin, Kachin and Shan. As mentioned above, the Aung San-Attlee Agreement had left the future of the Frontier Areas to the decision of its people.
Jointly gaining Independence with Burma After having successfully negotiated with the British, U Aung San turned his attention to the non-Burman nationalities and persuaded them to jointly obtain independence with Burma. He promised the frontier peoples separate status with full autonomy within the Burma Union, active participation at the centre within a Senate-like body, protection of minority rights, and the right of secession. He also promised to make the agreed terms into law as guarantee of their right for the future, and told them they need have no fear of the Burman. The negotiations between Aung San, as the sole representative of the interim Burmese government, and the Chin, Kachin and Shan, were held at the Panglong Conference in February 1947.
U Aung San successfully persuaded the Chin, Kachin, and Shan to join Independent Burma as equal, co-independent partners, and the historic Panglong Agreement was thus signed on February 12, 1947. The essence of the Panglong Agreement – the Panglong Spirit -- was that the Chin, Kachin, and Shan did not surrender their rights of self-determination and sovereignty to the Burman. They signed the Panglong Agreement as a means to speed up their own search for freedom together with the Burman and other nationalities in what became the Union of Burma. Thus, the preamble of the Panglong Agreement declares: Believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins, and the Chins by their immediate co-operation with the interim Burmese government.
The Panglong Agreement therefore represented a joint vision of the future of the pre-colonial independent peoples -- namely the Chin, Kachin, Shan and the interim Burmese government led by Chief Minister Aung San, who came into power in August 1946 according to the Burma Act of 1935. The interim Burmese government was a government for the region formerly known as Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma, which included such non-Burman nationalities as the Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), and Karen. The Arakan and Mon were included because they were occupied by the British not as independent peoples but as the subjects of the kingdom of Burman or Myanmar. The Karens were included in the Legislative Council of Ministerial Burma according to the 1935 Burma Act because the majority of the Karens (more than two-thirds of the population) were living in delta areas side by side with the Burmans. Since these peoples were included in the Legislative Council of Ministerial Burma, U Au! ng San could represent them in Panglong as the head of their government. Thus, the Panglong Agreement should be viewed as an agreement to found a new sovereign, independent nation-state between peoples from pre-colonial independent nations of what they then called Frontier Areas and Burma Proper, who in principle had the right to regain their independence directly from Great Britain, and to form their own respective nation-states. In other words, the Panglong Agreement was an agreement signed between the peoples of a post-colonial nation-state-to-be. Ever since the Union of Burma gained independence in 1948, the date the Panglong Agreement was signed has been celebrated as Union Day. The observance of February12th as Union Day means the mutual recognition of the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other nationalities, including the Burmans, as "different people historically and traditionally due to their differences in their languages as well as their cultural life". It is also the recognition of the distinct national identity of the Chin, Kachin, Shan, and other nationalities who had the right to gain their own independence separately and to found their own nation-state separately. In other words, it is the recognition of pre-colonial independent status of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan, and other nationalities as well as their post-colonial status of nation-state-to-be.
Condition Underpinning the Creation of the Union of Burma
According to the Aung San-Attlee Agreement, the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry (FACE) was formed to inquire through an additional and specific consultation about the wishes of the frontier peoples. The British government appointed Col. D. R. Rees-William as Chairman of the FACE. Since the committee conducted its inquiry after the signing of the Panglong Agreement during March and April 1947, the evidence they heard was generally in favour of cooperation with Burma but under the condition of:
Equal rights with Burman,
Full internal autonomy for Hill Areas [ that is, ethnic national states] , and The right of secession from Burma at any time.
The FACE finally concluded its report to the Government that the majority of witnesses who supported cooperation with Burma demanded the "right of secession by the States at any time".
The FACE report, particularly the right of secession, was strongly criticized by such Burman nationalists as U Saw and Thakhin Ba Sein who had earlier refused to sign the Aung San-Attlee Agreement. They accused Aung San of having given up Burman territory and argued that the Frontier Areas were just the creation of the colonial policy of "divide and rule". U Aung San dismissed this criticism as historically unfounded and politically unwise. And he said, "The right of secession must be given, but it is our duty to work and show (our sincerity) so that they don't wish to leave." And in keeping with his promise to the Chin, Kachin and Shan leaders at the Panglong Conference to make agreed term into law, the right of secession was provided for in the 1947 Union Constitution of Burma, Chapter X, Article 201, and 202:
Chapter (X): The Right of Secession
201. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Constitution or in any Act of Parliament made under section 199, every state shall have the right to secede from the Union in accordance with the condition hereinafter prescribed. 202. The right of secession shall not be exercised within ten years from the date on which this Constitution comes into operation.
Although the "right of secession" was put into law in the Union Constitution, Burma did not become a genuine federal union.
The End of Aung San’s Policies of Pluralism and Federalism
At the Panglong Conference in 1947, the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other non-Burman nationalities were promised, as Silverstein observes, the right to exercise political authority of [ administrative, judiciary, and legislative powers in their own autonomous national states] and to preserve and protect their language, culture, and religion in exchange for voluntarily joining the Burman in forming a political union and giving their loyalty to a new state. Unfortunately, U Aung San, who persuaded the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other non-Burman nationalities to join Independent Burma as equal partners, was assassinated by U Saw on July 19, 1947. He was succeeded by U Nu as leader of the AFPFL. When U Nu became the leader of the AFPFL, Burman politics shifted in a retro-historical direction, backward toward the Old Kingdom of Myanmar or Burman. The new backward-looking policies did nothing to accommodate non-Myanmar/Burman nationalities who had agreed to join Independent Burma only for the sake of "speeding up freedom".
As a leader of the AFPFL, the first thing U Nu did was to give an order to U Chan Htun to re-draft U Aung San's version of the Union Constitution, which had already been approved by the AFPFL Convention in May 1947. U Chan Htun's version of the Union Constitution was promulgated by the Constituent Assembly of the interim government of Burma in September 1947. Thus, the fate of the country and the people, especially the fate of the non-Burman/Myanmar nationalities, changed dramatically between July and September 1947. As a consequence, Burma did not become a genuine federal union, as U Chan Htun himself admitted to historian Hugh Tinker. He said, "Our country, though in theory federal, is in practice unitary."
On the policy of religion, U Nu also reversed U Aung San's policy after the latter was assassinated. Although Aung San, the hero of independence and the founder of the Union of Burma, had opted for a "secular state" with a strong emphasis on "pluralism" and the "policy of unity in diversity" in which all different religious and racial groups in the Union could live together peacefully and harmoniously, U Nu opted for a more confessional and exclusive policy on religion. The revision of Aung San's version of the Union Constitution thus proved to be the end of his policy for a secular state and pluralism in Burma, which eventually led to the promulgation of Buddhism as the state religion of the Union of Burma in 1961.
For the Chin and other non-Burman nationalities, the promulgation of Buddhism as the "state religion of the Union of Burma" in 1961 was the greatest violation of the Panglong Agreement in which U Aung San and the leaders of the non-Burman nationalities agreed to form a Union based on the principle of equality. They therefore viewed the passage of the state religion bill not only as religious issue, but also as a constitutional problem, in that this had been allowed to happen. In other words, they now viewed the Union Constitution as an instrument for imposing "a tyranny of majority", not as their protector. Thus, the promulgation of Buddhism as the state religion of Burma became not a pious deed, but a symbol of the tyranny of the majority under the semi-unitary system of the Union Constitution.
There were two different kinds of reactions to the state religion reform from different non-Burman nationalities. The first reaction came from more radical groups who opted for an armed rebellion against the central government in order to gain their political autonomy and self-determination. The most serious armed rebellion as a direct result of the adoption of Buddhism as state religion was that of the Kachin Independence Army, which emerged soon after the state religion of Buddhism was promulgated in 1961. The "Christian Kachin", as Graver observes, "saw the proposal for Buddhism to be the state religion as further evidence of the Burmanization [Myanmarization] of the country," which they had to prevent by any means, including an armed rebellion. The Chin rebellion, led by Hrang Nawl, was also related to the promulgation of Buddhism as the state religion, but the uprising was delayed until 1964 owing to tactical problems. Thus, the Chin rebellion wa! s mostly seen as the result of the 1962 military coup, rather than the result of the promulgation of Buddhism as the state religion in 1961.
The second reaction came from more moderate groups, who opted for constitutional means of solving their problems, rather than an armed rebellion. The most outstanding leader among these moderate groups was Sao Shwe Thaike of Yawnghwe, a prominent Shan Sawbwa who was elected as the first President of the Union of Burma. Although a devout Buddhist, he strongly opposed the state religion bill because he saw it as a violation of the Panglong Agreement. As a president of the Supreme Council of United Hills People (SCOUHP), formed during the Panglong Conference, he invited leaders of not only the Chin, Kachin and Shan, the original members of the SCOUHP, but also other non-Burman nationalities -- the Karen, Kayah, Mon, and Rakhine (Arakan) -- to Taunggyi, the capital of Shan State, to discuss constitutional problems. Unfortunately, these problems still remain unsolved. The conference was attended by 226 delegates and came to be known as the 1961 Taunggyi Conferenc! e, and the movement itself was known later as the Federal Movement.
The Federal Movement in 1961-62
At the Taunggyi Conference, all delegates, except three who belonged to U Nu's party, agreed to amend the Union Constitution based on Aung San's draft, which the AFPFL convention had approved in May 1947, as noted already. At the AFPFL convention, U Aung San asked, "Now when we build our new Burma shall we build it as a Union or as Unitary State?…. "In my opinion", he answered, "it will not be feasible to set up a Unitary State. We must set up a Union with properly regulated provisions to safeguard the right of the national minorities." According to U Aung San's version of the constitution, the Union would be composed of National States, or what he called "Union States" such as the Chin, Kachin, Shan and Burman States and other National States such as Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Mon and Rakhine (Arakan) States. "The original idea", as Dr. Maung Maung observes, "was that the Union States should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs! of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary."
U Chan Htun had reversed all these principles of the Federal Union after Aung San was assassinated. According to U Chan Htun's version of the Union Constitution, the Burma Proper or the ethnic Burman/ Myanmar did not form their own separate National State; instead they combined the power of Burman/Myanmar National State with the whole sovereign authority of the Union of Burma. Thus, while one ethnic group, the Burman/ Myanmar, controlled the sovereign power of the Union, that is, legislative, judiciary, and administrative powers of the Union of Burma; the rest of the ethnic nationalities who formed their own respective National States became almost like the "vassal states" of the ethnic Burman or Myanmar. This constitutional arrangement was totally unacceptable to the Chin, Kachin, Shan who signed the Panglong Agreement on the principle of equality, and also for other nationalities.
They therefore demanded at the 1961 Taunggyi Conference the amendment of the Union Constitution and the formation a genuine Federal Union composed of National States, with the full rights of political autonomy, i.e., legislative, judiciary and administrative powers within their own National States, and self-determination including the right of secession. They also demanded separation between the political power of the Burman/Myanmar National State and the sovereign power of the Union, i.e., the creation of a Burman or Myanmar National State within the Union.
The second point they wanted to amend on the Union Constitution was the structure of Chamber of Nationalities. The original idea of the creation of the Chamber of Nationalities was that it was not only to the safeguard of the rights of non-Burman nationalities but also for the symbolic and real equality, envisaged at the Panglong Conference. Thus, what they wanted was that each National State should have the right to send equal representatives to the Chamber of Nationalities, no matter how big or small their National State might be. In other words, they wanted a kind of Upper House like the American Senate. But what had happened according to U Chan Htun's Union Constitution, was that while all the non-Burman nationalities had to send their tribal or local chiefs and princes to the Chamber of Nationalities; it allowed Burma Proper to elect representatives to the Chamber of Nationalities based on population. Thus, the Burman or Myanmar from Burma Proper, who composed majority in terms of population, were given domination in the Union Assembly.
In this way, the Union Assembly, according to U Chan Htun's version of the Union Constitution, was completely under the control of the Burman or Myanmar ethnic nationality. Not only did the powerful Chamber of Deputy had the power to thwart aspirations and interest of non-Burman nationalities, but the Burmans also dominated even the Chamber of Nationalities. That was the reason the total votes of non-Burman nationalities could not block the state religion bill even at the Chamber of Nationalities. Thus, all the non-Burman nationalities now viewed the Union Constitution itself as an instrument for imposing "a tyranny of majority", not as their protector. They therefore demanded a change of such constitutional injustice at the 1961 Taunggyi Conference. Thus, the Federal Movement and its Taunggyi Conference can be viewed, as noted by a Shan scholar Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, as "a collective non-Burman effort to correct serious imbalances inherent in the constitution! " of 1947.
In response to the demand of the 1961 Taungyi Conference, U Nu had no choice but to invite all the political leaders and legal experts from both Burman and non-Burman nationalities to what became known as the Federal Seminar at which "the issues of federalism and the problems of minorities would be discussed with a view to finding a peaceful solution." The meeting opened on 24 February, 1962 in Rangoon while the parliament was meeting also in regular session. But before the seminar was concluded and just before U Nu was scheduled to speak, the military led by General Ne Win seized state power in the name of the Revolutionary Council in the early morning of 2 March, arresting all the non-Burman participants of the Federal Seminar and legally elected cabinet members, including U Nu himself, dissolving the parliament, suspending the constitution and ending all the debate on federal issues.
The Military Coup in March 1962
Brigadier Aung Gyi, the most powerful but second only to General Ne Win in the Revolutionary Council, stated that the main reason of the military coup in 1962 was "the issue of federalism." The Burma Army, which staged the coup d́état, was "the product of Burman nationalism," as a Shan leader and scholar Chao Tzang Yawnghwe pointed out, "a national sentiment revolving around racial pride and memories of the imperial glories of Burinnong, Alaungpaya and Hsinphyusin, and was very much enraged by the federal movement. They were desperate too, since a successful constitutional reform would undermine the army's supremacy in the non-Burman areas. Moreover, if the constitutional reform was carried out successfully, the Burman would be on the same level as non-Burman nationalities and this certainly was unthinkable for Burman national-chauvinists like Ne Win and Aung Gyi.
Although the Burma Army was originally established by Aung San as the BIA (Burma Independence Army) during the Second World War, two factions from very different backgrounds made up the Thirty Comrades, the core of the BIA. "Twenty-two of the young comrades were followers of the old writer and national hero, Thakhin Kodaw Hmaing" and were later known as "Kodaw Hmaing-Aung San faction". But another eight, including Ne Win, came from the "Ba Sein-Tun Oke faction." As noted already, Ba Sein refused to sign the Aung San-Attlee Agreement, mainly because of non-Burman nationalities issues on which he could not agree with U Aung San. As a matter of the fact, while Aung San had officially recognized, by signing that agreement, the pre-colonial independent status of the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other non-Burman nationalities, and their right to regain independence directly from Great Britain and their right to form their own respective sovereign nation-states without a! ny mutual attachment to Burma, Ba Sein and his fellow U Saw, who later killed Aung San, could not recognize historical truth and refused to sign that agreement in 1947. They also accused U Aung San of being a traitor of Burman traditional nationalism, and they went about saying that Burma had been sold down the river by Aung San. Hence, General Ne Win and Brigadier Aung Gyi, as the most faithful disciples of the Ba Sein-Tun Oke Burman national-chauvinist faction, reclaimed their vision of Burma -- which in their view U Aung San betrayed. And they promulgated the Unitary State Constitution in 1974 by force.
Ever since the chauvinistic Burma Army launched a full range of "Myanmarization" measures under the leadership of General Ne Win, the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Rakhine (Arakan), Shan and other non-Burman nationalities have had no choice but to struggle for their survival by any means, including the use of arms. Today almost all non-Burman nationalities are fighting against the central government in order to gain full political autonomy and self-determination within the Union of Burma. Thus, the civil war in Burma which began at the time of independence intensified under General Ne Win's military dictatorship and his successor, the present military junta, which came into power in 1988, in order to suppress the nation-wide popular uprising for a democratic change.
Struggle for the Second Independence
As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi correctly points out, the struggle for democracy, equality and self-determination in present Burma is the struggle for the second independence of Burma because what Burma's leaders tried hard to achieve in the first independence movement had all been coercively negated by General Ne Win in the 1962 military coup. Moreover, the 1962 military coup abruptly interrupted the federal movement, which indeed was a struggle for the reformation of a genuine federal union in accordance with the Panglong Agreement and Spirit. Thus, the nation-wide democratic movement in 1988 can be seen as the struggle for the second independence, especially as the revival of the spirit of Panglong. Likewise, the formation of the UNLD can be viewed as the continuation of federal movements in 1950s and 1960s, then led by the SCOUHP.
In order to achieve the goal of the struggle for the second independence, the UNLD therefore adopted the following policies as its objectives: (1) To establish a genuine federal union.
(2) To guarantee democratic rights, political equality, and self-determination for all nationalities of the Union.
(3) To build a firm unity of all nationalities in the Union based on the principles of equality and justice.
(4) To promote the development of all member states of the Union.
(5) To abolish all types totalitarianism in Burma.
(6) To establish internal peace and tranquility through dialogue.
The UNLD believes that for building a genuine federal union, the Union constitution must be based on a democratic administrative system, because as noted by a Shan analyst, "….democracy is an essential pre-condition for federalism. Federalism will not work in a polity where there is no democracy because federalism is, at the bottom, about decentralization of power and limits placed on power. In federalism the above is achieved via a set of arrangement that limits and divides or disperses power, so that parts of the whole are empowered and are further enabled to check central power and prevent the concentration of power." In short, democracy and federalism are inseparable, as head and tail of a coin, in a pluralistic and multi-ethnic country like Burma.
The Basic Principles of Federal Union
On the formation of a genuine Federal Union, the UNLD has adopted seven principles of federalism for the future constitution of the Federal Union of Burma, at its conference held in Rangoon, on June 29 - July 2, 1990. These seven principles are:
The constitution of the Federal Union of Burma shall be formed in accordance with the principles of federalism and democratic decentralization. The Union Constitution shall guarantee the democratic rights of citizens of Burma including the principles contain in the United Nation's declaration of universal human rights.
The Union Constitution shall guarantee political equality among all ethnic national states of the Federal Union of Burma.
The Federal Union of Burma shall be composed of National States; and all National States of the Union shall be constituted in terms of ethnicity, rather than geographical areas. There must be at least eight National States, namely, Chin State, Kachin State, Karen State, Kaya State, Mon State, Myanmar or Burma State, Rakhine (Arakan State), and Shan State.
The Union Assembly shall be consisting of two legislative chambers: the Chamber of Nationalities (Upper House) and the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House). The Chamber of Nationalities (Upper House) shall be composed of equal numbers of elected representatives from the respective National States; and The Chamber of Deputies (Lower House) shall be composed of elected representatives from the respective constituencies of the peoples.
The creation of Chamber of Nationalities based on equal representation of the member states of the Union is intended to safeguard the rights of National States and minorities in the Union government. It also intended as a symbol and instrument of the principle of equality among all nationalities of the Union. In addition to the Union Assembly, all member states of the Union shall form their own separate Legislative Assemblies for their respective National States. In Federalism there must be a clear separation of Union Assembly, or Federal Parliament, from the Legislative Assemblies of the member states of the Union. Moreover, the residual powers, that is, all powers, except those given by member states to the federal center, or the Union, must be vested in the Legislative Assembly of the National State. In this way, the Union Constitution automatically allocates political authority of legislative, judiciary, and administrative powers to the Legislative Assembly of the National States. Thus, all member states of the Union can freely exercise the right of self-determination through the right of self-government within their respective National States.
The Sovereignty of the Union shall be vested in the people of the Union of Burma, and shall be exercised by the Union Assembly. Moreover, the central government of the Federal Union shall have authority to decide on action for: (i) monetary system, (ii) defense, (iii) foreign relation, and (iv) other authorities which temporarily vested in the central government of Federal Union by member states of the Union.
UNLD Policies concerning the Power Transition
After the election held in May 1990, the UNLD adopted some policies to be applied during the power transition from an authoritarian military junta to a democratically elected government. Among them: (1) tripartite dialogue, (2) national reconciliation, and (3) national convention. In this paper I shall discuss briefly the need for national convention and tripartite dialogue, the policies adopted by the UNLD at the conference held in Rangoon from June 29-July 2, 1990. I shall, however, omit in this paper the policy of National Reconciliation, the program that is mainly conducted by the UNLD in exile together with other democratic forces, such as NCGUB, NCUB, NDF, and others.
(a) UNLD for Tripartite Dialogue
From the very beginning, the UNLD has opted for a non-violent political transition in Burma, from military dictatorship to a democratic open society. The UNLD believes that Democracy is the only form of sustainable governance which guarantees both individual citizens and national and cultural collectivities in Burma the rights of full participation in the development of social, economic, and cultural resources available to all citizens of the Union. Enduring democracy therefore requires the active participation of all the citizens -- as individual citizens and as members of an ethnic-cultural collectivity -- to build and renovate not only the democratic institutions but also the structure of the Union itself, which shall balance the different interests of nationalities for the common good of all member states of the Union.
As the UNLD believe in democratic principles and the rights of full participation of all nationalities in the process of nation rebuilding, the UNLD demands dialogue as an integral part of the political transition, not only in the process of power transformation from military rule to a democratically elected body, but also in the entire process of democratization, which includes the restructuring of the Union into a federal system. Therefore, in the processes of both power transformation and democratization, dialogue must be the main instrument for bringing all individual citizens and collective members of nationalities of the Union together at all levels.
After the general election in 1990, the UNLD believed that at least two levels of dialogue might be necessary to achieve the goal of the creation of democratic open society and the establishment of a genuine Federal Union. The first step of dialogue is for power transformation, and the second step, which is more important than the first level, will be for the entire process of democratization and the restructuring of the Union into a federal system. The UNLD also believes that since the NLD had received the trust of the people in a landslide victory of the 1990 election, a dialogue for "transformation of power" should be a dialogue between the NLD led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the military junta, the de fecto government of present Burma. However, the nature of such dialogue at the first level must focus only on the transition of state powers into a democratically elected body. In other words, it will be a dialogue for administrative power but not for legislative power or constitutional matter. The core of dialogue at that level therefore is just for a "breakthrough" of political stagnation, which have created a number of political and social crises in today Burma.
The UNLD strongly believes that political crisis in Burma today is not just a conflict between dictatorship and democracy. It involves an unmanaged and neglected conflict, including a civil war that has consumed many lives and resources of the country for five decades. The root of civil war in Burma is the conflict over power-sharing between the central government, which so far has been controlled by one ethnic group called Myanmar or Burman, and all National States of the Union. In other words, the root of the problem is, as mentioned already, a constitutional problem or more specifically, the rights of self-determination for non-Burman nationalities who joined the Union as equal partners in 1947. Indeed, most nationalities in Burma are now fighting for rightful self-determination and autonomous status of their respective National States within the Union. Since they were not able to resolve their problems through dialogue, they have no choice but to attempt! to solve their disputes through violent means of civil war.
In order to avoid further bloodshed and violence during the political transition, the UNLD believes that the second level of dialogue must start almost simultaneously with the first level of dialogue. The aim of dialogue at the second level is to solve the entire political crisis in Burma and to end five long decades of civil war through the creation of a genuine Federal Union. The UNLD believes that without a genuine Federal Union there is no means of ending the civil war in Burma. Without ending the civil war, there is no means of establishing a democratic system either. Thus, the participation of all ethnic nationalities in the political transition is the most important element in the entire process of democratization and restructuring the Union into a federal system. They all have the right to participate in this important process of restructuring the Union. Thus, dialogue at that level must no longer be a two-way dialogue but a Tri-partite dialog! ue, which shall include three forces, namely the forces composed of the non-Burman nationalities, the democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the military junta.
(b) The Need for a National Convention
On June 29 to July 2, 1990, the UNLD held its conference at the YMCA Hall in Rangoon. At that conference, all the members of the UNLD unanimously adopted a policy on national convention that states that in order to lay down the general guidelines of a federal constitution which will serve as the foundation on which to build a new democratic society for the future Federal Union, a National Consultative Convention shall be convened, similar to the Panglong Conference. As UNLD had adopted from the start a policy for the restoration of "internal peace and tranquility through dialogue," it was envisaged that such a National Consultative Convention will ensure peace, unity and equality for all nationalities of the Union. Alternatively, it could be said that the National Consultative Convention would serve as a kind of peace talks aiming at ending the civil war, which had consumed many lives and the country’s resources for five decades.
The UNLD consulted issue of the National Consultative Convention with the NLD, the winner of the general election in 1990. On August 29,1990, the UNLD and the NLD made a joint declaration known as Bo Aung Kyaw Street Declaration. Some of the points included in this declaration were:
(i) After the emergence of the Pyithu Hluttaw (Union Assembly or Federal Parliament), this Hluttaw shall form the elected government at the earliest time, then the Pyithu Hluttaw shall organize to convene a "National Consultative Convention" consisting of the representatives from all the nationalities, and other personages that are deemed necessary to take part in this convention. This convention shall lay down general guidelines for the Constitution of the Union. The Pyithu Hluttaw shall draw up, approve, and enact the constitution of the Union in compliance with above general guidelines.
(ii) All nationalities shall have full rights of equality, racially as well as politically, and, in addition to having the full rights of self-determination, it is necessary to build a Union with a unity of all the nationalities which guarantees democracy and basic human rights.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that the democratic movement in Burma since1962 was the continuation of the federal movement led by the SCOUHP in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At the same time I have highlighted the fact that the role of the UNLD in the struggle for democracy and federalism is the continuation of a political role undertaken by the SCOUHP in the federal movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The only difference between the SCOUHP and the UNLD is neither the policy nor the goal, but the political situation. In the early 1960s, the Federal Movement was seen mainly as a separatist movement by the majority ethnic Burmese (Burman). Thus, the non-Burman nationalities under the leadership of the SCOUHP did not receive enough support from their fellow citizens, the Burman majority. At the Taunggyi Conference, for instance, three delegates who belonged to U Nu's Party were against the move for the formation of a genuine federal union, despite the ! fact that they all were non-Burman politicians.
By contrast, the movement for federalism is now seen as the movement for equality. The UNLD non enjoys strong support from all the democratic forces in Burma, especially the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) headed by Dr. Sein Win, the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), the National Democratic Fronts (NDF), the All Burma Students' Democratic Fronts (ABSDF), and other democratic forces. They all agree that the ultimate goal of democratic movement in Burma is the establishment of a genuine federal union, where all indigenous nationalities can live peacefully together. This unity in the same policy is the best hope not only for the UNLD but also for the future of the entire Federal Union of Burma.
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